

**SELECTING PRESIDENT WILSON'S ARMY:  
THE DRAFT AND IMMIGRATION IN SIX  
MASSACHUSETTS COMMUNITIES**

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Acceptance Page

This submission is accepted.

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES	v
PREFACE	1
INTRODUCTION	3
CHAPTER 1. The Immigration Restriction Campaign Preceding World War I	16
CHAPTER 2. The Call to the Colors	36
CHAPTER 3. Uncle Sam Wants (Some of) You	59
CHAPTER 4. Friends and Neighbors	79
ENDNOTES	109
BIBLIOGRAPHY	118

## LIST OF GRAPHS AND TABLES

Figure 1 Annual Net Immigration as Percentage of Existing Population	19
Figure 2 Chinese Immigration to the United States for Selected Years	21
Table 1 Distribution of Exempted and Held for Service Samples in Beverly	89
Table 2 Cell Populations for Dependency Analysis in Beverly	89
Table 3 Dependency Exemptions in Beverly	90
Table 4 Distribution of Exempted and Held for Service Samples in Brookline	91
Table 5 Cell Populations for Dependency Analysis in Brookline	91
Table 6 Dependency Exemptions in Brookline	92
Table 7 Distribution of Exempted and Held for Service Samples in E. Brookfield	93
Table 8 Cell Populations for Dependency Analysis in East Brookfield	94
Table 9 Dependency Exemptions in East Brookfield	94
Table 10 Distribution of Exempted and Held for Service Samples in Lawrence No. 1	96
Table 11 Cell Populations for Dependency Analysis in Lawrence No. 1	96
Table 12 Dependency Exemptions in Lawrence No. 1	97
Table 13 Distribution of Exempted and Held for Service Samples in Lawrence No. 2	97
Table 14 Cell Populations for Dependency Analysis in Lawrence No. 2	98
Table 15 Dependency Exemptions in Lawrence No. 2	98
Table 16 Distribution of Exempted and Held for Service Samples in Lawrence No. 3	99
Table 17 Cell Populations for Dependency Analysis in Lawrence No. 3	99
Table 18 Dependency Exemptions in Lawrence No. 3	100
Table 19 Distribution of Exempted and Held for Service Samples for Composite	101
Table 20 Cell Populations for Dependency Analysis for Composite	101



## **Preface**

In 2008, as I prepared for a travel-study trip led by Salem State University Professors Christopher E. Mauriello and Stephen Matchak to parts of France and Belgium where the Western Front of World War I had been, I found a list of the men from my hometown, Beverly, Massachusetts, who had died in military service during that war. I was struck by two things. First, the names on the list included many names that were on street corners, bridges, parks, and athletic fields that I had used and passed by nearly every day of my life, never knowing why those names were affixed. Second, judging by the surnames, the men represented a wide array of ethnic backgrounds. I knew that Beverly at the time of World War I had a diverse economic and ethnic composition. It was home to both a world-leading factory and to the residences of some of the wealthiest families in the United States. Old Yankee money shared the City with the immigrants and children of immigrants who mainly worked tended the great estates or in a gigantic factory. Those immigrants and children of immigrants were participants and descendants of the participants in the massive waves of immigration that the United States had received in the nineteenth and early twentieth century.

For men of my generation, the heavy hand of the Vietnam War draft had not fallen equally on all, though I was among the lucky ones with a draft lottery number that guaranteed I would never be called. Like some of America's earlier wars, Vietnam had seemed like a rich man's war, but a poor man's fight. I wondered how the diverse group of Beverly men had come to be in the World War I army; had they served willingly, by a draft, or both.

That curiosity set me on the course that produced this thesis, which is an attempt to answer two questions: 1) Why did the United States adopt a draft, despite long-standing tradition of using mainly volunteer war-time forces and adverse experience with the draft? and 2) Did anti-immigrant feeling very strong at the time affect who was sent to war?

Thanks to members of the faculty at Salem State University, especially Dr. Andrew Darien, I could ask those questions in a meaningful way. Thanks also to the other readers of this work, Dr. Emerson W. Baker and Dr. Elizabeth A. Duclos-Orsello, who taught me the nature of historical inquiry and helped focus my thoughts on this topic. Thanks to the archivists at the National Archives, librarians in Beverly, Brookline, Worcester and Lawrence, and the wonders of Ancestry.com, I was able to find evidence to answer those questions.

In quiet cemeteries all over France and Belgium and in the United States, America's one hundred twenty thousand World War I dead rest. Although the much larger war a generation later obscures our gaze of the Great War, we should not forget those who were America's World War I army.

## Introduction

Their number, 258, was up. In the Summer of 1917, James J. Kelliher, the 29-year-old Massachusetts-born son of Irish immigrants, married with two children and working as a machinist, knew that he would be the first man in Beverly, Massachusetts to face the possibility of being drafted to fight in the American army soon to join the bloody combat that had been raging in Europe for nearly three years. In Brookline, Massachusetts that potentially fatal distinction was held by Edward J. Conroy, the American-born son of American-born parents. He was 21 years old, single and working as a real estate manager. World War I had set off a wave of hyper-nationalism in the United States, with attacks on “hyphenated Americans” and calls for “100 percent Americanism.” Despite that sentiment, the Irish-American Kelliher would be exempted from service, as he should have been under the law because of his family. Conroy, despite his appeal of the local draft board’s decision, would be held for service. Nearly every man held for service in 1917 was sent to war.<sup>1</sup>

In early 1917, the United States was in the midst of a strong anti-immigrant campaign, and took the first important step toward the enactment, in 1921 and 1924, of the most restrictive immigration law in American history. A few months after that action

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<sup>1</sup>Notes to Introduction

Census Taker Return Sheets, *Fourteenth Census of the United States, Number and Distribution of Inhabitants* Accessed online at [www.Ancestry.com](http://www.Ancestry.com) Nov. 21, 2012. Massachusetts, Beverly, Ward 1, District 14, image 23, and Massachusetts, Brookline, District 164, image 37. Selective Service Registration cards, Accessed online at [www.Ancestry.com](http://www.Ancestry.com) Nov. 21, 2012. Records of the Selective Service System (World War I). Record Group 163, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). Research for this thesis was done at the NARA Branch in Waltham, Massachusetts; according to a communication to the author from NARA staff, Selective Service System records are now housed at the NARA branch in St. Louis, MO.

on immigration the country had to create a mass army to fight in World War I. This raises the question of whether anti-immigrant bias affected who was chosen for that army.

Kelliher, Conroy and ten million other men had had a number assigned them in the days just after June 5, 1917, when almost all of the men in the United States between the ages of 21 and 30 had registered for what turned out to be the first successful large-scale military draft in American history. On July 20, Secretary of War Newton F. Baker had spun a huge lottery wheel to determine the sequence in which each local board would consider prospective draftees. The first number that Baker drew was 258. So Kelliher, Conroy and 4,645 other men around the United States knew that their number was up.<sup>2</sup>

The World War I military draft brought together two great debates in America: How should the United States react to the great waves of immigration arriving on America's shores and across the land borders? And how should American forces be recruited and controlled? Examining why the draft was adopted, how it operated, and whether the selections of who was drafted were affected by anti-immigrant feeling enables us to know more about early twentieth century attitudes toward immigration and to witness an early demonstration of the power of the federal government in managing America.

After a spirited defense of the traditional volunteer recruitment method, Congress adopted a military draft. That enactment was a major step in state-building and in the growth of the power and reach of the federal government. The bitter opposition to a draft that had occurred in the Civil War was not repeated. Although the 1917 draft would end

soon after the conclusion of the war, drafts would be used in war-time until the unpopularity of the Vietnam War led to the repeal of the draft in 1973.<sup>3</sup>

Despite a great wave of public cooperation with the draft, there was a tiny amount of scattered resistance. The most significant organized resistance was the so-called “Green Corn Rebellion,” which flared in Oklahoma. In all, anti-draft violence claimed around thirty lives. More worrisome from the government’s view were the men who failed to register, to appear before the draft boards, or to appear for induction. In all, the estimate was that around three hundred forty thousand “slackers” never registered, 1.4 percent of those who should have done so. In addition, around twenty thousand men claimed a religious objection to service, although ninety per cent of them abandoned their claims. Resistance to the World War I draft gave rise to the National Civil Liberties Bureau, which became the American Civil Liberties Union in 1920. Still, on the scale of twenty-four million men who registered, nearly three million men drafted and a nearly four-million-man army, draft resistance is a minor side-story.<sup>4</sup>

The efficient functioning of the massive operation of the World War I draft was remarkable. It demonstrated the birth of the modern Managerial State. The overwhelmingly orderly registration of so many men in only one day is made even more impressive when one realizes that the law under which the registration occurred had been passed less than three weeks earlier. There would be other registration days, some smaller, one larger, but all of those days were also peaceful and orderly. In Massachusetts, 360,825 men registered on the first registration day. By the end of the World War I, nearly nine hundred thousand Massachusetts men and nearly twenty-four million Americans in total would have registered for the draft. During the course of the

World War I, Massachusetts sent nearly two hundred thousand men and about fifteen hundred women to service in the military.<sup>5</sup>

From the start of the European war in 1914, President Woodrow Wilson's administration had played an active role in the diplomacy behind the fighting. Repeated efforts to mediate a peace had been unsuccessful. Most voters in the United States, though, did not want America to take part in the bloody combat. Wilson was reelected in 1916 largely because "He kept us out of war." As the war continued, German actions, American economic interests, sentimental attachments and Allied propaganda led most public opinion to favor the Allies, though a pacifist movement still opposed United States participation. Unrestricted submarine warfare in the Atlantic and clumsy German diplomatic action in Mexico, solidified the anti-German feeling, and Wilson decided to take the United States to war. Support for that course was strong, but not unanimous; the vote in the Senate on the Declaration of War was 82-6 and in the House of Representatives 373-50.<sup>6</sup>

If the United States was to play a prominent role in the war and the subsequent peace, an effective fighting force had to be created and put in the field. Remarkably, in only eighteen months, the United States expanded its Armed Forces more than ten-fold, while simultaneously expanding industrial and agricultural production to meet war-time needs. At the start of war, the United States Regular Army had only one hundred twenty thousand men; in addition, the state-controlled National Guard units, which were of varying quality, had about another one hundred eighty thousand men. To meet the needs of the war, the United States built an army of four million men, largely by use of the draft. The ability of the United States to assemble that fighting force and put half of it in

Europe to join the fighting provided the Allies with an advantage that led to the collapse of the Central Powers.<sup>7</sup>

In 1917, the United States was at a unique place in its history. It was a political power of continental dimension and a world-wide economic force. With the conquest or acquisition of Hawaii, the Panama Canal Zone, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and other places, the nation was building an overseas empire. In the fifty years since the American Civil War, then still within living memory, the United States had undergone remarkable transformations. The trans-Mississippi West, seized from Native Americans and conquered from Mexico, had been incorporated into the Union, and the frontier line had been erased. Transcontinental railroads had been built, great industrial establishments had been created, and vast territories had been brought into food production. Further, massive immigration had changed the ethnic, religious, and cultural composition of the nation. Since the Civil War, nearly thirty million immigrants from all over the world had arrived in the United States. It was against this recent history that the United States entered World War I.<sup>8</sup>

In addition to examining the triumph of the state-builders in achieving the draft, it is interesting to learn whether draft decisions were influenced by the then-ongoing campaign to restrict immigration, prompted by the negative reaction to immigration described as “nativist.” To do examine this issue comparisons are made of the census classification data from the 1910 federal census and the outcome of draft selection decisions. At the time of that census, the United States was home to just over ninety-three million people, with nearly 89 percent classified as “White.” The census listed slightly

more than 10 percent of the population as “Negro” and reported less than 0.5 percent as members of other non-white groups. Little detailed information was provided in the census on the non-white population. For example, unlike the “White” population, the places of birth of the non-white population was not reported. With regard to the white population, the 1910 census divided the white population into three classes. “Native white-Native parentage” was the classification for individuals who were born in the United States with two parents who also had been born in the United States. In the second classification “Native white-Foreign or mixed parentage” were individuals who were themselves born in the United States, but who had at least one parent who had been born outside the United States. Finally, the classification “Foreign-born white” was for individuals who themselves had been born outside the United States. Thus, the census classifications provided a direct characterization of an individual’s position along the spectrum from fully native to fully foreign. Enumeration was also provided on foreign-born individuals who had become citizens of the United States.<sup>9</sup>

This thesis uses, “native” to refer to those classified as “Native white-Native parentage.” “Second generation” refers to those classified as “Native white-Foreign or mixed parentage.” “First generation” refers to those classified as “Foreign-born white.”

As detailed in the 1910 census, the white population of the United States had been born in or had parents who had been born in more than two dozen enumerated countries. More than 20 percent of the white population was first generation; another 14.5 percent, were second generation. Thus, more than one-third of the white people of the country were immigrants or children of immigrants. It was from this varied population that the country had to raise its World War I army.

The effect of immigration was even more striking in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, where the local draft boards examined were located. Of the white inhabitants of Massachusetts, more than two-thirds either had at least one parent born outside the United States or were themselves of foreign birth. The non-white population of the Commonwealth was only 1.2 percent. Examination of the experience of non-white men with the World War I draft would require a much larger sample of the roughly ten thousand non-white Massachusetts men who can be assumed to have registered for the draft than can be generated from the six boards examined. Therefore, the question of discrimination in draft decisions on the basis of race, in the sense the word is used at the beginning of the twenty-first century, is not examined. Scholarship looking at that question on a nation level has shown that African-Americans were drafted at higher rates than Americans of European ancestry, but suffered a somewhat lower mortality rate. Apparently, African-Americans tended to be kept out of combat and used as labor battalions.<sup>10</sup>

It is valuable to explore whether negative feelings about immigrants and their offspring affected draft decisions at the local levels, an inquiry not previously made. The reaction of the existing residents at the national level to the great tide of immigration between the Civil War and World War I is chronicled by John Higham in *Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860-1925*. Higham's work was first written in 1955, and reissued with a new prologue in 2002. Despite its age, Higham's study of nativist reactions in the period before World War I continues to provide valuable insight into American attitudes about culture, ethnicity and inclusion within the national community.<sup>11</sup>

Higham sees two competing camps in America's reaction to immigration. One camp, called by Higham "the cosmopolitans," saw America as the great melting pot, able to cope with, and indeed be enriched by, the huge and diverse incoming population. The other camp, labeled by Higham "the nativists," opposed immigration for three principal reasons: (1) it would dilute and degrade the Anglo-Saxon/Nordic founding population; (2) Catholics in the immigrant wave would undermine the influence of the founders' Protestant faith; and (3) alien radicals among the immigrants would threaten the American system of government. The nativists waged a long campaign to control and limit immigration, which will be referred to as "restrictionism." A few years after World War I, that campaign resulted in the extremely restrictive immigration laws of 1921, 1924, and 1929. Under that set of statutes, immigration to the United States fell from 1,218,489 in 1914 to an annual quota of 150,000, much of which went unused. In 1931, for example, only 97,138 immigrants arrived.<sup>12</sup>

Against the background of the restrictionist campaign, the entry of the United States into the Great War brought new urgency to the question of whether the recent immigrants and their children had truly become part of America. Would they be willing to serve in the military? Conversely, the war provided an opportunity for members of the newer populations to prove their loyalty and justify their inclusion in the American community.

America faced another important controversy as it sought to create a mass army: How should America's fighting forces be recruited and organized? At various times in America history those questions had been answered in different ways. A thorough study of those varying answers is provided by John Whiteclay Chambers II in *To Raise an*

*Army: The Draft Comes to Modern America.* The basic model for America's peacetime military for most of its history had been a small standing national army, supplemented by state-controlled militias, called the "National Guard" by the time of World War I. For several years before the war, military planners urged adoption of a system of universal military training (UMT), similar to that used in many European countries. Those advocates for a reformed military were disciples of Emory Upton, a military theorist who wrote in the years after the Civil War. After his death in 1881, his work was published by the War Department. The "Uptonians" wanted the United States to be a strong national state, with an international empire. In their view, such a state needed a reliable modern army, which they believed the traditional military system could not supply. Other advocates, especially supporters of the National Guard, opposed such a change as contrary to American tradition and as a step toward militarism and tyranny.<sup>13</sup>

The need to have a large army to put in the field before the Allies collapsed forced a resolution of that debate. Within the administrations and in Congress, leaders debated whether the massive army that was needed for World War I could be created in the traditional manner of seeking volunteers for temporary service either in the federally-controlled U. S. Volunteers or in the National Guard. The alternative was a military draft. Abandoning traditional American recruitment methods and despite the experience of the bitterly resented Civil War draft, the decision was made to adopt a draft. The Wilson administration opted for a selective military draft for several reasons. It did not seem likely that the number of volunteers needed could be raised. Further, the failure of the volunteer system in Britain to produce enough men and the damages volunteerism had done to the civilian economy had convinced the administration that the government

should decide how each man could best serve the war effort. Finally, former President Theodore Roosevelt “offered” to raise and command troops himself, and the Wilson administration did not want someone they viewed as unreliable to do so. A divided Congress agreed to a draft by a vote of 313-109 in the House of Representatives and 81-8 in the Senate.<sup>14</sup>

Under the draft law that Congress enacted, local three-man draft boards, each serving an area called a “division,” determined which men were held for military service and which were exempted. In the rhetoric of the draft, every man in the age group had already “volunteered” so the local board only decided who would be exempted and thus was technically called the “Exemption Board.” As the board examined each man for exemption, whether that man had one or more dependents was a critical factor, but the man’s census classification-whether native, second generation, or first generation-should not have been relevant to the board. However, foreign birth and national origin could be legitimate factors in a board’s decision-making regarding a particular man, because those of foreign birth, who had not at least declared their intention to become citizens of the United States, were exempt from the draft. Further, men who had been born in an “enemy” nation were ineligible for service.<sup>15</sup>

Technically, in 1917 the local boards granted most men “deferral” rather than an “exemption.” In theory, a deferred man could have his deferral revoked. This might well have happened if the war had gone on into 1919, as the supply of men held for service was running short when the war ended abruptly. However, since the war did end, virtually no man deferred in 1917 saw war-time service. Deferral in 1917 amounted to an exemption, and will be referred to as such throughout this work.

Historians have done prior work on the draft, though usually as a sidelight to larger questions of the war and societal reaction to it. Further, most of the work that has looked at the draft has done so from the national level. David M. Kennedy's *Over Here: The First World War and American Society*, concludes that, despite efforts to be fair, "the distribution of draft exemptions in World War I tended to parallel the distribution of civilian privilege, and the obligation of service fell disproportionately on the powerless and the poor." Roughly the same conclusion is reached by Jennifer D. Keene in *Doughboys, the Great War and the Remaking of America*. She writes that "local draft boards...imposed their own agenda in the recruitment process" because of the desire of the members of such boards "to preserve the social, economic and political order of civilian society." Finally, Jeanette Keith concludes in *Rich Man's War, Poor Man's Fight: Race, Class, and Power in the Rural South During the First World War* that local draft boards served the interests of local elites.<sup>16</sup>

The conclusions drawn by Kennedy, Keene, and Keith can be tested by examining draft decisions and their relation to restrictionist sentiment. Did the boards target the powerless immigrants and their sons, as Kennedy's work suggests? Did the boards impose their own agenda on the selection process, as Keene claimed? Did they serve the interests of local elites, as Keith claimed? Or did the boards make decisions that simply reflected the compositions of the populations from which the men under consideration came? Wealth and power are hard to establish from a century away. However, the distribution of prospective draftees along the fully-native-to-fully-alien continuum can be known, and is a reasonable proxy for place within the society. This data can help determine whether local draft selection was influenced by restrictionist attitudes about immigration. A

comparison of exemption/held-for-service decisions by those boards with 1910 census data can illuminate patterns of discrimination or demonstrations of impartiality. Since men who wanted to serve had had ample opportunity to volunteer, most men being considered by the boards likely wanted to be exempted. The close study of the exempted/held-for-service decisions will indicate whether anti-immigrant feeling led to a disproportionate number of decisions to deny exemption and hold for military service immigrants and their sons. Did the pool of men exempted from service and the pool of men held for service accurately reflect the population of the community served? As the boards considered the critical question of whether a man had dependents who would be unsupported if he was inducted, were they influenced by the census classifications of the particular men being considered for exemption?

**Chapter One**, “The Immigration Restriction Campaign Preceding World War I,” focuses on the very heated political debate regarding immigration that was approaching its climax when the United States entered the World War I.

**Chapter Two**, “A Call to the Colors,” highlights the debate in the years before the war and at the time of United States entry into the war regarding how the nation’s military forces should be recruited and organized. It offers an answer to the question of why the draft was adopted, abandoning the traditional volunteer recruitment approach.

**Chapter Three**, “Uncle Sam Wants (Some of) YOU!” examines the provisions of the draft law that emerged from the legislative debate at the start of the war.

**Chapter Four**, “Friends and Neighbors,” presents a full explanation of the methodology used to examine the boards’ decisions. In order to answer the question of whether or not feelings about immigrants affected the decisions of the exemption board,

it is necessary to examine several streams of data. The chapter contains the detailed numerical analysis of the exemption/selection decisions for each of the boards studied. Finally, the chapter provides possible explanations for the result found, and suggests potential lines of research.

For all the numbers and legal provisions of the draft law, in the end the World War I draft was about individual men. For Kelliher, his dependent family likely got him exempted, without regard to his status as a second generation immigrant. As a single man, Conroy was the type of man the draft intended to send to the army; that he was the American-born son of American-born parents made no difference. Were their experiences typical?

## Chapter 1. The Immigration Restriction Campaign Preceding World War I

Wide open and unguarded stand our gates,  
And through them passes a wild motley throng,  
Men from the Volga and Tartar steppes.  
Featureless figures from the Hoang-Ho,  
Malayan, Scythian, Teuton, Kelt, Slav,  
Flying the Old World's poverty and scorn;  
These bringing with them unknown gods and rites,  
Those tiger passions here to stretch their claws,  
In street and alley what strange tongues are these,  
Accents of menace in our ear,  
Voices that once the Tower of Babel knew.

Thomas Bailey Aldrich, 1882<sup>17</sup>

In order to examine the question of whether the anti-immigrant campaign of the early years of the twentieth century affected who was sent to war by the local draft boards, it is useful to understand the background of the negative reaction to immigration, described as “nativism,” has had in our history. This brief outline of immigration and the reaction to it in the years before the World War I draft provides that background.

A powerful element of the American national myth represents the country as an exceptional place welcoming people from all over the world to a land of freedom, but some of the then-existing population has reacted negatively to new immigrants, especially if they viewed the new arrivals as fundamentally unlike themselves. Even among the iconic Founding Fathers, in language that sounds very familiar at the strat of

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<sup>17</sup>Notes to Chapter 1

Thomas Bailey Aldrich, “The Unguarded Gates,” *Atlantic Monthly*, 1882, quoted in Roger Daniels, *Coming to America*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed. (Princeton: Visual Education Corporation, 2002), (hereafter Daniels, *Coming to America*),275.

the twenty-first century, some people expressed the view that the new-comers threatened what they believed was the “real” America.

Why should Palatine Boors be suffered to swarm into our Settlements, and by herding together establish their Language and Manners to the Exclusion of our own? Why should Pennsylvania, founded by the English, become a Colony of Aliens, who will shortly be so numerous as to Germanize us instead of our Anglifying them, and will never adopt our Language or Customs, any more than they can acquire our Complexion.

Benjamin Franklin  
*Observation Concerning the Increase of Mankind.* 1751<sup>18</sup>

Nativism has had significant impact on politics and law at several times in American history. In the Republic's early days, the Federalist administration's belief that political opposition was being driven by what they viewed as French Radicalism led to the Alien and Sedition Acts. Two much more significant national movements based on nativism were the Know Nothings in the years just before the Civil War, and the virulent anti-immigrant sentiment at the start of the twentieth century. In the years just before, during, and after World War I, advocates for restriction or even termination of immigration waged a very public campaign to close the Golden Door. That campaign culminated in the highly restrictive immigration laws of 1921 and 1924.<sup>19</sup>

The history of immigration and the nativist reaction to it have been extensively studied in the existing historiography. As regards the World War I draft, the two principal occurrences of strong anti-immigration sentiment can illuminate what may have been in the minds of local draft boards. The first of those occurrences, running from roughly from 1830 to 1860, climaxed with the rise of the American Party, the so-called Know Nothings. The Know-Nothing episode is examined to provide background for the episode of nativism and restrictionism that was in progress in 1917. The anti-immigrant campaign that may have more directly affected the draft began in the 1880s. After subsiding around

the turn of the twentieth century, that campaign resumed, and was approaching its climax as the United States entered World War I.<sup>20</sup>

Of course, all Americans are immigrants or the descendants of immigrants. As the first humans in the New World, Native Americans are the indigenous people. For the rest of the population, the immigration, voluntary or otherwise, occurred in the last four hundred years. Immigration numbers must be viewed with caution. The gathering of data has varied over time, both as to what information was collected and by whom. Further, there has been significant out-migration and remigration, which has varied both among migrant groups and over time. Finally, political boundaries of sending states have changed, adding uncertainty to the categorization of immigrants.<sup>21</sup>

With all the caveats stated, nobody can question that migration to the United States has been massive and sustained. In colonial times, it is estimated that about nine hundred thousand people arrived; about one-third of them enslaved Africans. Immigrants from the British Isles were the principal, though not exclusive, white arrivals to what became the United States. Although the 1790 census did not enumerate place of birth or ancestry information, it has been estimated that nearly three-quarters of the white population of 3.2 million enumerated in that census were from or were descended from immigrants from Britain. In addition, another 10 percent had roots in Ireland; of those, roughly 60 percent were Scotch Irish.<sup>22</sup>

In the early National Period, immigration information was not recorded. After 1820, however, there is data on the numbers of new arrivals. Further, estimates have been made of the number of departures, yielding a net migration figure. What is more important than raw numbers of net migrants is the relative size of the net incoming

population to the existing population of the country. Figure 1 below presents the net migration each year as a percentage of the estimated existing population for that year.

Annual Net Immigration as Percentage of Existing Population




Figure 1

Sources: Derived by the author from data in U.S Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970, Bicentennial Edition, Part 1* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1975) and Walter F. Wilcox, ed. *International Migrations, Volume II: Interpretations* (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1931) accessed on-line October 19, 2012 at [www.nber.org/chapters/c5104](http://www.nber.org/chapters/c5104). Additional notes on data in endnote.<sup>23</sup>

As shown in Figure 1, immigration rose sharply in the 1820s, a rise that was reversed by the time of the Civil War. Recovering from an economic downturn in 1819, America attracted people from many European countries. The 1840s potato blight in Ireland triggered the largest wave of immigration, relative to existing population, prior to World War I. It was that sharp increase that provoked the nativist reaction that climaxed in the Know Nothing movement. The increase in numbers of the new immigrants, rising from around one hundred fifty thousand in the 1820s to more than two million in the 1850s, caused a nativist reaction, mainly because the immigrants were not predominantly Protestant British; they were Catholics, mainly from Ireland.<sup>24</sup>

The Irish immigration was motivated by several events. In 1822, Ireland suffered famine. Further, in 1829 a new British enactment disenfranchised most poor Irish farmers. Those events contributed to an Irish immigration to the United States that numbered around seven hundred thousand between 1820 and 1840. Beginning in 1846, blight hit the potatoes on which most of the poor in Ireland depended for food. Between 1846 and 1854, 1.3 million Irish arrived in the United States.

In addition, the potato blight and political unrest in 1848 in Germany led to a movement that included many Catholics. Germans had always been a significant component of the immigration stream. In the first national census in 1790, Germans and their descendants represented 6 percent of the white population. Still the scale of the German movement after 1830 was very large. Rising from less than ten thousand in the 1820s, nearly one million Germans arrived in the 1850s. In all, more than 1.5 million Germans immigrated between 1820 and 1860.

After reaching a peak in 1854, immigration was already declining sharply as the nation approached war. The Civil War and the period of uncertainty that followed it discouraged immigration to the United States. The pre-war annual peak of immigration would not be exceeded for nearly twenty years, by which time the population of the United States had grown by nearly 70 percent.<sup>25</sup>

A significant portion of the Union Army in the Civil War was made up of recent Irish immigrants. Distinctively ethnic units served with distinction, which helped reduce nativism in the post-Civil War years.

Coincident with the decline of the European-sourced immigration arriving on the East Coast of the United States, a very separate immigration was happening on the West

Coast. Although several nations contributed to that stream, it was overwhelming from China, arriving in the newly-admitted state of California. The economic draw of available employment drew the Chinese, first as laborers under contract and then as builders of the transcontinental railroad. The figure below represents the history of Chinese immigration to the United States from its first enumeration in 1853 until the period just after the drastic curtailment of that movement by the Exclusion Act of 1882.

Chinese Immigration to the United States for Selected Years




Figure 2

Sources: Derived by the author from data in U.S Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970, Bicentennial Edition, Part 1* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1975)

The reaction to the Chinese immigration set a pattern for later American nativist sentiment and resulting efforts to restrict immigration. Compared to the immigration to the East Coast, the West Coast immigration was numerically small, but the size of the movement in comparison to the then-population of California was significant. In 1850, the population of California was only 92,597. In 1860, the state's population was 379,944, which included more than forty thousand new Chinese immigrants, more than 10 percent of the growth in population. The 1860s saw another nearly sixty-five thousand

newly-immigrant Chinese. California started the 1870s, the last decade before the Exclusion Act, with 540,247 people. During that decade another one hundred twenty-five thousand Chinese arrived on its shore, while the state added a total of roughly three hundred twenty thousand people in all to its population. That large influx of immigrants relative to population was followed by a virulent reaction that led to the harsh and racist Exclusion Act of 1882.<sup>26</sup>

As the door was being slammed on the West Coast, a new wave of immigrants was arriving on the East Coast. The regional origins of the immigrants had changed from previous immigrant waves. Between 1820 and 1860, 90 percent of the immigrants were from the Northwestern Europe region that had been the ancestral home for virtually all of the residents of the United States, with virtually none from Scandinavia, (0.82%), Eastern Europe (0.06%) or Southern Europe (0.65%). Between 1880 and 1900, however, Scandinavia sent 12 percent of the immigrants, Eastern Europe 9.5 percent and Southern Europe 11.5 percent. Even though Northwestern Europe sent 53 percent of the period's immigrants, many people at the time perceived the post-1880 wave of immigration as "new" and different. The perception was that the more recent immigrants would not blend into American society, because they did not speak English, came from economically backward areas of Eastern and Southern Europe, and had been subjects of non-democratic governments.<sup>27</sup>

The immigration wave that began around 1880 subsided after the Panic of 1893, but resumed (or a separate wave began) after 1900. That later wave continued until the start of World War I sharply curtailed immigration. Between 1901 and 1914, nearly thirteen million immigrants arrived. As immigration increased after 1900, the

composition of the incoming stream again changed significantly. Northwestern Europe contributed only 15 percent of the huge numbers of immigrants. Meanwhile, although the contribution of Scandinavia dropped (4.93%), immigration from both Eastern Europe (21%) and Southern Europe (26%) rose very sharply. With the start of World War I, immigration dropped by nearly 75 percent between 1914 and 1915.<sup>28</sup>

Many Italians and Eastern European Jews arrived in the generation before World War I. Nearly four million Italians arrived, three-quarters of them between 1901 and 1914. Unlike earlier Italian immigrants from the more prosperous North, these Italians were mainly from impoverished Southern Italy. Many Jews had arrived in earlier migration, especially with other German nationals in the 1840s and 1850s. The Jews who arrived between 1880 and 1914 were mainly from Russia and Poland. The number of Jews who arrived is harder to determine because they were officially enumerated by their religion and by their languages; even that data that was not uniformly collected. However, the native-tongue data allows an estimate to be made of the number of Jews who arrived. In 1910, there were 1,664,142 foreign-born residents in the United States whose mother tongue was either Yiddish or Hebrew. Of those, 1,051,071 are reported in the 1910 census as having emigrated between 1899 and 1910. The 1920 census reported 2,043,613 foreign-born residents whose mother tongue was either Yiddish or Hebrew. Since some of those counted in 1910 must have died, at least three hundred eighty thousand more Jews must have arrived between 1910 and 1920; most of them almost certainly arrived in the United States between 1910 and 1914, before the war curtailed immigration. Thus, many of the members of the Jewish population were very recent arrivals as the draft was being conducted. The most recent arrivals had not been in the

United States long enough to become citizens, though some may have declared the intention to do so.<sup>29</sup>

As the successive waves of immigration arrived in the United States, they provoked very different reactions among the existing population. The colonial impulse was to do everything possible to encourage immigration into what was to become the United States. With a small European (and captive African) population in a narrow strip on the edge of the continent, and with rival European powers planting settlements in North America, the English colonies simply wanted more people. The politically motivated Alien and Sedition Acts were a brief aberration to the generally welcoming attitude. Most people believed that the growing new country could use and assimilate the new settlers. America was the shining “city on a hill” with a God-given mission to bring freedom to the world. Providing an essentially open door to would-be settlers was fully consistent with that mission. In the second half of the nineteenth century, Oliver Wendell exemplified this belief in America’s powerful ability to take all comers, “We are the Romans of the modern World, the great assimilating people.” The open, democratic and equalitarian ethos would persist from earliest days to our own times.<sup>30</sup>

Another recurrent theme in American history has been the negative reaction to immigrants, the nativist reaction. Aside from occasional altruistic concerns that immigrants would be exploited, and dubious claims of criminality and adverse economic effect, the real objection to immigration has generally boiled down to this: as Roger Daniels expressed it “they are not like us.” Whether the objection was their language, as with Franklin; their religion, as with the Know Nothings; or later, their national origins,

the real objection to the new-comers has always been the claims that they cannot be assimilated; that they cannot, will not and should not become part of “us,” the cognitive construct of the right composition for the national community.<sup>31</sup>

Even in Colonial and Early National times, as evidenced by the quote from Ben Franklin, not every new arrival was equally welcome. Since England had been engaged in a centuries-long struggle with Catholic Spain and Catholic France, and with Spanish and French colonies nearby, the colonies did not want Catholic settlers. Even Maryland, founded to admit Catholics, became concerned by Catholic settlers. On its establishment in 1733, Georgia prohibited Catholics, fearing they would be allies of adjacent Spanish Florida. With no controls on immigration in Colonial times, Catholics did come, but in such small numbers as to be nearly invisible. Catholics constituted only about 0.1 percent of the population in the 1790 census.<sup>32</sup>

The largely theoretical anti-Catholicism of earlier times became very real as a significant number of Catholics began to arrive. In Boston, for example, the Catholic diocese was created in 1818. A few years later a mob burned a convent and school in Charlestown, not far from the site of the Revolutionary War Battle of Bunker Hill. Fantasies of international Catholic plots and lurid stories of supposed abuses within Church institutions feed an anti-Catholic hysteria among nativists. There were many incidents of anti-Catholic violence, for example in Philadelphia in May, 1844. As the trickle of Catholics turned into a stream and then a great flood in the late 1840s, those who believed in assimilation lost ground, and nativism became more virulent and active.<sup>33</sup>

The sporadic anti-Catholic outbursts of the 1830s and early 1840s became the first great wave of nativism in the 1850s, climaxing in the Know Nothing movement. The Know Nothings grew out of the nativist sentiments that had produced the anti-Catholic activities of the preceding years. For some, the club-like membership in movements provided stability in turbulent times that saw the appearance of large-scale industrial and transportation enterprises. Of course, in the 1850s, the United States was facing the looming issue of slavery. For some, the seeming unity offered by a combined nativist response to the incoming Catholic wave could divert attention from the differences on the slavery question, and reinforce national unity. At base, though, the movements were a nativist response to the incoming Irish and German Catholics. The nativists of the 1850s believed that “real” Americans (i.e. Protestants descended of the original settlers) should see the Catholics as a threatening the continuity of the imaginary “us” of earlier times.<sup>34</sup>

The stage was set for the Know Nothings by groups like the American Republican Party, which had a brief burst of political success in the early 1840s before fading away after only a few years. A similar group, the Order of United Americans, was structured as a secret fraternal society, and proclaimed the superiority of the Teutonic race in general, and Anglo-Saxons in particular. Some participants saw these movements as vehicles for other reforms, like the cause of temperance. In the main however, the nativist movements of the 1840s attracted skilled craftsman, displaced by increasing factory-based production; they found easy scape-goats in the immigrants who were a large component of the work-force of the new factories.<sup>35</sup>

The so-called Know Nothing Movement rose quickly to be a serious force on the national political stage, only to fade away just as quickly as it had risen. The Know

Nothings arose as the Order of the Star-Spangled Banner (OSSB) began in 1853. At first the OSSB was a secret group, of which members claimed to “know nothing” when journalists like Horace Greeley inquired. In addition to the nativist-inspired core of its strength, the Know Nothings attracted political opportunist set adrift by the collapse of the Whig Party. The Know Nothings told themselves that they were defending the danger to “American” culture and political institutions presented by Catholics who were former subjects of monarchies. The Know Nothings believed that these new people could not understand the government created by the patriots of the War of Independence.

Ironically, it has been estimated that two-thirds of the Know Nothings were themselves descendants of post-Revolution immigrants. Unlike the earlier groups, the OSSB was an explicitly political group, aiming to counter the perceived increasing potential political power of the quickly growing Catholic population, especially in the cities. Pulling together various elements, the American Party emerged, and became powerful in several states in the middle of the 1850s. In New York, for example, the 1854 election produced nineteen Know Nothing congressmen in the state’s twenty-three member delegation. Similarly, despite the misgivings of the Boston Brahmin class, the Know Nothings dominated Massachusetts politics at mid-decade.<sup>36</sup>

Despite its quick electoral success, for most Americans of the 1850s the nativist cause was simply not the most important issue of the time. As early as 1855, the Know Nothings themselves were dividing over the issue of slavery. As slavery came to dominate the political discussion, the new Republican Party drew northern support from the Know Nothings. By 1857, the Know Nothings were finished as a national force, although they retained strength in some states for a couple of more years.<sup>37</sup>

Two key features of the Know Nothings and the other nativist groups of the mid-nineteenth century deserve attention: 1) they relied on “not-like-us” rhetoric, and 2) they arose in response to a sharp increase in the relative scale of immigration.

The Civil War effectively ended nativist sentiment in the North, as the need for unity to fight the war transcended divisions of religion or ancestry. Explicitly immigrant detachments fought visibly and well in defense of the Union, alongside units composed of the longer-settled groups. After the war, the patriotic sentiment in the reunited nation left little room for the exclusionary rhetoric of the nativists. Further, the rapid settlement of the trans-Mississippi West and the explosive growth of the industrial cities demanded a rapidly expanding work-force that immigration helped to provide. Further, immigration was at relatively low levels in the 1870s.

Around 1880, immigration rose sharply, to absolute and relative levels not seen in thirty years. That increase was followed by a resurgence in the nativist reaction to immigration that had been dormant since the Civil War. That resurgence led to a victory for nativism in the 1920s in the form of the most restrictive immigration laws the United States has ever seen.<sup>38</sup>

The nativism and the restrictionism that preceded World War I shared much of its rationale and rhetoric with the nativist wave that had climaxed with the Know Nothings. What is distinctive about the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century outburst of nativism is that the racist arguments of earlier times were bolstered by the “scientific racism” of the time. (At the time, the word “race” had not acquired the meaning it was to have later in the twentieth and into the twenty-first century. In the period before World

War I, “race” included population groupings that what would later be identified with their “ethnicity” or “nationality” or “cultural background.”)<sup>39</sup>

To change national immigration law, turn-of-the-century restrictionists advanced new expressions of the traditional rationales for restriction or elimination of immigration: (1) the economy of the United States could not provide sufficient employment for both the existing inhabitants and in-coming immigrants; (2) with strange languages and customs, the new immigrants could not become part of American society, contributing instead to growing urban problems including poverty, poor housing and increasing criminality; and (3) the immigrants were not equipped to participate in democratic government, and indeed included radicals who threatened governing institutions. The restrictionists added to those old arguments the claim, allegedly built on the “science” of the day, that the immigrants then arriving were of genetically inferior stock, and that they would corrupt and destroy the superior Teutonic and Anglo-Saxon blood-line of the existing population. The restrictionist campaign based on those arguments, old and new, led to the national-origins based Immigration Acts of 1921 and 1924.

The argument that there were new immigrants would lower wages and take scarce jobs from the existing population is an old one. In the period just before 1900, the argument had special power for two reasons. As famously expounded by Frederick Jackson Turner, the 1880 census had shown that the frontier line of European and later American settlement that had existed since the seventeenth century was gone. The presumably unlimited ability of the unsettled West to absorb settlers was proclaimed as at an end. Then, of course, the Panic of 1893 raised the fears usually seen in economic hard times of immigrant competition for scarce jobs.<sup>40</sup>

Fear that immigrants would not blend into America and would exacerbate growing social problems was both familiar and new. Even before Franklin, the “strange” (i.e. non-English) language of most new settlers and their different customs had been raised by those opposed to immigration. As the nineteenth century drew to a close, the problems accompanying rapid urban growth added to the concern regarding the new immigrants’ place in American society. Indeed, many of those most active in combatting urban problems favored restriction on immigration out of philanthropic concern regarding immigrants already here.<sup>41</sup>

The turn-of-the-century restrictionists were hard-pressed to advance the old argument that immigrants could not understand or participate intelligently in democratic institutions. The second and third generations descended from the Irish settlers of the 1840 and 1850s had become the majority of voters in many of the large cities of the East. In Boston, for example, Hugh O’Brien won election as mayor in 1884. Indeed the rise to political power of the Irish spurred many restrictionists to oppose additional immigration precisely because the new settlers would displace native power-brokers.<sup>42</sup>

Faced with the reality of the power of the Irish vote, the argument was advanced that the new immigrants would not merely make poor democratic citizens, but that among their numbers were political radicals who were seeking to destroy American political and economic institutions. This was similar to the rationale behind the Alien and Seditions Acts in Federalist times. The catalyzing event for the reemergence of this strain of thought was the Haymarket Bombing of May, 1886 in Chicago. Blamed (with little proof) on alien radicals, the bombing seemed to the nativist to show that American government was under foreign attack. The rise of the International Workers of the World

seemed to provide further proof that not just American government, but capitalism itself was under attack. Fear of labor unrest, allegedly inspired by alien radicals gradually moved big business, which had traditionally favored immigration as source of cheap labor, to support restrictions on immigration. In the early twentieth century, both the 1903 assassination of President McKinley and the “Bread and Roses” strike in Lawrence, Massachusetts in 1912 renewed nativist fears of alien radicals.<sup>43</sup>

What was new to the argument for restriction was an increasingly virulent racism. The restrictionists achieved political success by combining the old nativist rationales with two intellectual developments: the old claim of Anglo-Saxon superiority, dressed in new intellectual garb, and the developing “science” of eugenics that seemed to provide a basis for those claims.

The intellectual movement called “Teutonism,” included a number of widely-respected scholars, many of them active at Harvard College, where they influenced the leaders of the restrictionist charge on the early twentieth century. The central assertion of Teutonism was that the Teutonic or Germanic races of Northwestern Europe, especially the Anglo-Saxons of England, had demonstrated their superiority by inventing democratic institutions. Further, the Teutonists argued that democracy had spawned capitalism, and therefore that the economic dynamism of the United States was also attributable to the Teutonic founders of the country. The farther a person was from Teutonic influence, they claimed, the less suited that person was to participate in American life. Conversely, the more Teutonic, and especially Anglo-Saxon, blood a man could claim, the more that man was entitled to lead in America. Needless to say, most of the Teutonist scholars were of English origin. For the long-dominant Boston Brahmin

Patrician class, Teutonism became a further support to claims of status that had been gradually eroding.<sup>44</sup>

What made Teutonism more than an elite intellectual fad was the emergence of the alleged “science” of eugenics. In 1865, Francis Galton had demonstrated that selective breeding of animals could alter the characteristics of off-spring. Around the turn of the twentieth century, this idea was transmuted into the notion that various human groups inherited largely immutable characteristics. William Ripley’s *The Races of Europe* (1899) seemed to provide a scientific basis for the Teutonists’ claims. Ripley claimed to have identified three European races: The Teutons were the best; next came a group of “Alpine” peoples; finally came the inferior “Mediterranean” peoples. Ripley’s book was a standard social science text for more than twenty years. For the restrictionists, the corollary of Ripley’s claims was that the Anglo-Saxon-descended people of the United States should prevent the “inferior” Mediterraneans from threatening their “superior” bloodline. This view, that the new immigrants presented a biological threat to America, reached its extreme with Madison Grant’s *The Passing of the Great Race* (1916). Conveniently for the restrictionists, it was exactly Ripley’s Mediterraneans who made up most the so-called “new” immigration after 1900. Thus, the Teutonic and eugenic theories combined with the more popular nativism based on economic and social concerns to form a coalition that persuaded Congress to change national policy on immigration.<sup>45</sup>

One of the first groups to arise in the pre-World War I wave of nativism was the American Protective Association, founded in 1887. Its rationale for restricting immigration was anti-Catholicism. It saw an international Catholic conspiracy

threatening American democracy. That approach, reminiscent of the Know Nothings, was doomed to political failure because Catholic groups like the Irish, then nearly fifty years after the great wave of their immigration, wielded significant political power. Like many nativist groups before it, the American Protective Association lasted little more than a decade, without having accomplished much.<sup>46</sup>

Of much more enduring impact was the Immigration Restriction League (IRL) formed in Boston in 1894. The principal founders of that group were Harvard classmates, who had been influenced by the Teutonist scholars there. With its elite Harvard roots, the IRL attracted many distinguished leaders from education, business and politics. At its base the IRL was an organization of Boston Brahmins, the group that had dominated Massachusetts from colonial days deep into the nineteenth century. At its start, the IRL included many who advocated restriction for essentially charitable reasons. They sought to solve the poor circumstances of immigrants already in the United States-slums, poverty, and economic exploitation-before new immigrants were admitted. As time passed and as immigration rose again after 1900, the IRL increasingly saw the immigrants as themselves responsible for those adverse circumstances. After 1900, the IRL came to embrace the eugenics-based intolerance for the new immigrant wave. The IRL and other nativists sought to use federal control over immigration, enacted in 1891, to “protect” America from the rising number of immigrants from countries that they viewed as producing “inferior” people.<sup>47</sup>

After rising in response to the increase of immigration in the 1880s, the restrictionist movement subsided as immigration dropped in response to the Panic of 1893. Also, American imperialism before and after the Spanish-American War

encouraged the increase in national population that renewed immigration would bring. The expansion of the empire also brought under the control of the United States foreign peoples like the Cubans and Filipinos.<sup>48</sup>

As the economy began to grow again in the late 1890s, the rate of immigration rose sharply, leading restrictionist groups like the IRL to become more active. The IRL's most prominent recruit from the Boston Brahmin class was Henry Cabot Lodge, a scholar and for thirty-seven years a member of Congress, first in the House of Representatives and after 1893 a leading member of the United States Senate. He would be the principal spokesman for immigration restriction. In the later years, he would be assisted by his son-in-law Congressman Augustus P. Gardner. Included in Gardner's district was Beverly, one of the communities whose draft board is examined.<sup>49</sup>

The IRL and its spokesman Lodge chose the imposition of a literacy test on would-be immigrants as the first step in immigration restriction. Various versions of the literacy test were introduced, usually by Lodge, in 1893, 1898, 1903, 1907, 1913, and 1915. It took many years for restrictionist sentiment to win majority support in Congress. Then, opposition at the presidential level prevented passage. The literacy bills were defeated in one or the other branch of Congress or vetoed by successive presidents.<sup>50</sup>

Under the influence of the sharp increase in immigration, the growing influence of eugenics, and the persistent advocacy of groups like the IRL, Congress was moving toward restriction. A special commission, the United States Immigration Commission, was created in 1910 to study the history of immigration and to recommend legislative action. Generally known by the name of its chair, Senator William P. Dillingham, the Commission issued a massive report in 1911. Not only did the report support a literacy

test, it embraced the eugenics arguments of the inferiority of the newly arriving immigrants. National origins-based immigration bills, based on the Dillingham Report, the eugenics movement and the advocacy of groups like the IRL gained support in Congress in the time just before World war I.<sup>51</sup>

The outbreak of war in Europe in 1914 turned up the temperature on immigration politics in the United States. Where the Civil War had provoked, in the North at least, an embrative nationalism, seemingly proven valid by immigrant detachments on the battlefield, World War I produced an exclusionary nationalism that had room only for “one hundred percent Americans.” Although a strong pacifist element wanted the United States to stay out of the war, the majority of American public opinion favored the Allies, and hoped for their victory. Effective anti-German propaganda heightened suspicion of German-Americans.

This volatile atmosphere was only heightened by yet another legislative battle over the literacy test in 1917. Congress passed the bill, again blocked by presidential veto. Restrictionist sentiment in Congress had grown strong enough to override the veto. Less than three months after the literacy requirement for immigrants passed, the United States entered World War I, and an army had to be created. Would the anti-immigrant sentiment behind “one hundred percent Americanism” and the literacy bill’s restriction on immigration affect the creation of that army?<sup>52</sup>

## Chapter 2. The Call to the Colors

The lesson of history in its application to universal service is an open book.  
Universal service and citizen armies are the bulwark of civil liberty.

General Enoch H. Crowder (1920)<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>53</sup>Notes to Chapter 2

Crowder, *The Spirit of Selective Service*, 57.

<sup>2</sup> Provost Marshall General, *Report of the Provost Marshall General to the Secretary of War on the first draft under the Selective-service act, 1917* (Washington, D.C.: Provost Marshall General's Office, 1918; repr., Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, 2010), (hereafter PMG, *First Report*), 80, table 1 and 2. Eben Putnam, ed., *Report of the Commission on Massachusetts' Part in the World War, History*, vol. I, (Boston: Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 1931), 250, 253. Christopher Capozzola, *Uncle Sam Wants You: World War I and the Making of the Modern American Citizen* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), (hereafter Capozzola, *Uncle Sam Wants You*), 28.

<sup>3</sup> *To provide for the common defense by increasing the personnel of the armed forces of the United States and providing for its training*, Public Law 76-783, *U.S. Statutes at Large* 54 (1940): 885.

<sup>4</sup> Provost Marshall General, *Final Report of the Provost Marshall General to the Secretary of War on the Operations of the Selective Service Systems*, (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1919; repr., Charleston, SC: Nabu Public Domain Reprints, 2010), (hereafter PMG, *Final Report*), 12. John Whiteclay Chambers II, *To Raise an Army: The Draft Comes to Modern America* (New York: Free Press, 1987) (hereafter Chambers, *To Raise an Army*), 212, 216. ACLU history from [www.aclu.org](http://www.aclu.org). accessed April 8, 2013.

<sup>5</sup> E. H. Crowder, *The Spirit of Selective Service* (New York: The Century Company: 1920 (hereafter Crowder, *Spirit of Selective Service*). PMG, *Final Report*, 19, table 1.

<sup>6</sup> Daniel M. Smith, *The Great Departure: The United States and World War I, 1914-1920* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965). Daniel H. Bennett, *The Party of Fear: The American Far Right from Nativism to The Militia Movement* (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), (hereafter Bennett, *The Party of Fear*), 184. Francis G. Wickware, ed., *The American Year Book: A Record of Events and Progress 1917* (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1918), (hereafter Wickwere, ed., *1917 Year Book*), 11.

<sup>7</sup> Crowder, *Spirit of Selective Service*, 176. Robert H. Zieger, *America's Great War: World War I and the American Experience* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), 51.

<sup>8</sup> Roger Daniels, *Coming to America, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed.* (New York: HarperCollins, 2002), 124.

<sup>9</sup> U. S. Bureau of the Census, *Thirteenth Census of the United States Taken in the Year 1910*, vol. 1 *Population* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1913), (hereafter U. S. Bureau of the Census, *1910 Census, I*) 23; 126; 140, table 17. If the Census still used birthplace classifications, the author would be "native born-mixed parentage" or second generation, as he is the son of a native father and an immigrant mother, who came to the United States from the Caribbean island of Trinidad after World War II under the so-called "War Brides Act." See *To expedite the admission to the United States of alien spouses and alien minor children of citizen members of the United States armed forces*, Public Law 79-271, U.S. Statutes at

On April 2, 1917, accompanied by mounted cavalry, President Woodrow Wilson went to a Special Session of Congress to ask for a Declaration of War against Germany. After some debate, Congress complied on April 6. The next day, the administration proposed a massive military expansion to fight that war, relying not on volunteers but on a military draft. The draft was a sharp break from previous American tradition and experience. The only previous federal military draft had been the extremely unpopular and largely unsuccessful Civil War draft. A few weeks, later, on April 28, supporters of a

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Large 59 (1945): 659.

<sup>10</sup> U. S. Bureau of the Census, *1910 Census*, I, 865, table 1. PMG, *Final Report*, 22.

<sup>11</sup> John Higham, *Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1896-1925* (1955, repr., New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1983), Kindle Edition, (hereafter Higham, *Strangers in the Land*).

<sup>12</sup> *An act to limit the immigration of aliens into the United States* (Emergency Quota Act of 1921), Public Law 67-5, *U.S. Statutes at Large* 42 (1921), 5. *Immigration Act of 1924*, Public Law 68-139, *U.S. Statutes at Large* 43 (1924), 153. Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970, Bicentennial Edition, Part 1* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1975), (hereafter U. S. Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics to 1970*), 105, Series C 89-119.

<sup>13</sup> Chambers, *To Raise an Army*, 70. Emory Upton, *The Military Policy of The United States* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1912), 3<sup>rd</sup> Impression. Obtained from Google Books.

<sup>14</sup> Wickwere, ed., *1917 Year Book*, 11.

<sup>15</sup> *AN ACT to authorize the President to increase temporarily the Military Establishment of the United States*, (hereafter *Army Bill of 1917*), Public Law 65-12, *U.S. Statutes at Large* 40 (1917): 76, 77-78. That statute dealt with topics other than the draft, but for simplicity sake the entire enactment will be referred to, as it was at the time, and cited as the Army Bill or the *Army Bill of 1917*. Because it has been superseded and repealed, the statute does not appear in the United States Code. All page citations to the *Army Bill* are to *U.S. Statutes at Large*. Also, see Appendix A to this thesis.

<sup>16</sup> David M. Kennedy, *Over Here: The First World War and American Society* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), (hereafter Kennedy, *Over Here*), 162. Jennifer D. Keene, *Doughboys, the Great War, and the Remaking of America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), (hereafter Keene, *Doughboys*), 9. Jeanette Keith, *Rich Man's War, Poor Man's Fight: Race, Class and Power in the Rural South during the First World War: World War I and the Making of the Modern American Citizen* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), (hereafter Keith, *Rich Man's War, Poor Man's Fight*), 198. See also, David R. Segal, *Recruiting for Uncle Sam: Citizenship and Military Manpower Policy* (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1989), (hereafter Segal, *Recruiting for Uncle Sam.*)

<sup>18</sup> Benjamin Franklin, *Observations Concerning the Increase of Mankind* (1751) quoted in Roger Daniels, *Guarding the Golden Door: American Immigration Policy and Immigrants Since 1882* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2004), (hereafter Daniels, *Guarding the Golden Door*), 84.

volunteer-based army made their stand. With the House meeting as Committee of the Whole, three hundred and seventy-seven members of the House of Representatives filed one-by-one by the desk of the House Clerk saying “yea” or “nay” on the continuation of the volunteer system. When the Clerk announced the tally, 98 yeas to 279 nays, the pattern was set for war-time military recruitment for the next sixty years. The adoption of

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<sup>19</sup> Higham, *Strangers in the Land*, 4, 20. *An act to limit the immigration of aliens into the United States* (also called Emergency Quota Act of 1921), Public Law 67-5, *U.S. Statutes at Large* 42 (1921), (hereafter *1921 Immigration Act*), 5. *Immigration Act of 1924*, Public Law 68-139, *U.S. Statutes at Large* 43 (1924), (hereafter *1924 Immigration Act*), 153.

<sup>20</sup> Walter F. Wilcox, ed. *International Migrations, Volume II: Interpretations* (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1931), (hereafter Wilcox, ed. *International Migrations*), accessed on-line October 19, 2012 at [www.nber.org/chapters/c5104](http://www.nber.org/chapters/c5104).

<sup>21</sup> Daniels, *Coming to America*, 30. *Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1931* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Printing Office, 1932) p. 124 as reproduced in Daniels, *Coming to America*, 67. *Return of the Whole Number of persons within the several Districts of the United States* (Philadelphia: 1793), accessed on-line at [www.census.gov](http://www.census.gov), October 17, 2012.

<sup>22</sup> Bennett, *The Party of Fear*, 28.

<sup>23</sup> Peter Schrag, *Not Fit for Our Society: Nativism and Immigration* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010), (hereafter Schrag, *Not Fit for Our Society*), 24. U. S. Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics to 1970*, 105, Series C 89-119; 8 Series A 6-8.

<sup>24</sup> Daniels, *Coming to America*, 146, Table 6.6.

<sup>25</sup> Data on annual population at U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics to 1970*, 8, Series A 6-8. See also data note p. 2. Immigration data at *ibid.* 105. Departure data interpolated by the author from *Bureau of Immigration, Annual Report, 1908* (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1909), 8, as quoted in Wilcox, ed. *International Migrations*, 89.

<sup>26</sup> One can assume the sharp spike in Chinese immigration in 1882 shown on Figure 2 was in anticipation of the coming restriction. U. S. Bureau of the Census, “Resident Population and Apportionment of the U. S. House of Representatives.” Accessed on-line October 21, 2012 at URL <http://www.census.gov/dmd/resapport/states/california.pdf>.

<sup>27</sup> Percentages calculated by the author from data at U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Historical to 1970*, 105, Series C 89-119. “Northwestern Europe” here means Britain, Ireland, Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Switzerland, and France. “Eastern Europe” includes Poland, except for 1899 and 1900 as Poland was not enumerated in those years.

<sup>28</sup> Percentages calculated by the author from data at U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics to 1970*, 105, Series C 89-119. Definitions of regions are defined in the source table except as noted in the previous endnote. However, numbers for Poland were not recorded between 1901 and 1919.

<sup>29</sup> U. S. Bureau of the Census, *1910 Census, I*, 960-961. U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Fourteenth Census of the United States, Vol. II Population, General Report and Analytical Tables* (Washington, DC:

the draft came because of Wilson's tremendous influence and the surge of patriotism that has been building since German attacks on vessels like the *Lusitania* and that reached a crescendo as the United States entered the war.<sup>54</sup>

The April, 1917 issue of National Geographic magazine published a sixteen-page spread of photographs, "The Call to the Colors," that showed uniformed Americans

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U. S. Government Printing Office, 1922), (hereafter U. S. Bureau of the Census, *1920 Census*), 973.

<sup>30</sup> Bennett, *The Party of Fear*, 2. For Holmes quote, Merle Curti, *The Growth of American Political Thought*, 1943, quoted in Higham, *Strangers in the Land*, 20.

<sup>31</sup> Daniels, *Guarding the Golden Door*, 8.

<sup>32</sup> Bennett, *The Party of Fear*, 17-22.

<sup>33</sup> Daniels, *Coming to America*, 9, 267. Barbara Miller Solomon, *Ancestors and Immigrants: A Changing New England Tradition*, (1955; repr., Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1989), (hereafter Solomon, *Ancestors and Immigrants*), 2. Schrag, *Not Fit for Our Society*, 26, 28. Bennett, *The Party of Fear*, 56.

<sup>34</sup> Bennett, *The Party of Fear*, xii, 35, 53, 99, 130.

<sup>35</sup> Bennett, *The Party of Fear*, 48, 53-54, 58, 106.

<sup>36</sup> Bennett, *The Party of Fear*, 111, 120, 130. Solomon, *Ancestors and Immigrants*, 10.

<sup>37</sup> Bennett, *The Party of Fear*, 123, 124, 126, 152.

<sup>38</sup> Bennett, *The Party of Fear*, xii, 155, 159.

<sup>39</sup> Roger Daniels, *Not Like Us: Immigrants and Minorities in America, 1890-1924* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1997), (hereafter Daniels, *Not Like Us*), vii.

<sup>40</sup> Higham, *Strangers in the Land*, 42.

<sup>41</sup> Solomon, *Ancestors and Immigrants*, 136.

<sup>42</sup> Solomon, *Ancestors and Immigrants*, 48.

<sup>43</sup> Higham, *Strangers in the Land*, 51, 54, 178. Schrag, *Not Fit for Our Society*, 51. Bennett, *The Party of Fear*, 181. Daniels, *Not Like Us*, 60.

<sup>44</sup> Solomon, *Ancestors and Immigrants*, 1, 61-63, 94. Higham, *Strangers in the Land*, 32. Daniels, *Coming to America*, 266.

<sup>45</sup> Solomon, *Ancestors and Immigrants*, 129, 145. Higham, *Strangers in the Land*, 155, 173.

<sup>46</sup> Bennett, *The Party of Fear*, 171-176.

preparing for war. It may have seemed to those who viewed the photographs that the country was united on military matters. Wilson could speak of a “nation which has volunteered in a mass,” and General Crowder, who would implement the draft, could speak of “universal service.” In fact, the World War I draft was the culmination of a protracted political debate regarding military recruitment policy that began around the turn of the twentieth century and climaxed with the entry of the United States into the war. At the beginning of the twentieth century, as the United States was growing as an economic power and creating an overseas empire, the political and military leaders of the nation debated how to create a modern army. Two principal issues were at the center of the debate: (1) How should the army be recruited? and (2) What level of government should control the components of the army? The beginning of the Great War in Europe brought that debate into sharper focus; the decision to enter the war brought the debate to a climax. The selection of the American army to be used in fighting the war provided an immediate test of the resolution of that debate.<sup>55</sup>

The most useful work on American military manpower policy over time is *To Raise an Army: The Draft Comes to Modern America* by John Whiteclay Chambers, II. Written in 1987, the book analyses the history of United States military manpower policy for its land forces to that year in terms of six “format models,” three of which came and

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<sup>47</sup> Solomon, *Ancestors and Immigrants*, 119. Higham, *Strangers in the Land*, 114. Daniels, *Not Like Us*, 28.

<sup>48</sup> Solomon, *Ancestors and Immigrants*, 119.

<sup>49</sup> Daniels, *Guarding the Golden Door*, 31.

<sup>50</sup> Daniels, *Guarding the Golden Door*, 33.

<sup>51</sup> Bennett, *The Party of Fear*, 179-180. Daniels, *Guarding the Golden Door*, 30.

<sup>52</sup> Bennett, *The Party of Fear*, 183. Daniels, *Guarding the Golden Door*, 46.

went before 1800. The colonies needed military forces to fight conflicts with the Native Americans and to meet the threat of England's imperial rivals, France and Spain. Chambers describes the colonial solution to armed force in two models, the *Settlement Model* and the *Colony Model*. In the earliest days of the colonies, the *Settlement Model* required every able-bodied man to be ready to fight in defensive combat, or in limited anti-Native American campaigns. Once the Native American threat had been pushed aside, each colony, using the *Colony Model* maintained a small paid standing defense force, with volunteers hired for the occasional expeditionary force, mainly in British imperial service. America fought the War of Independence using what Chambers describes as the *Confederation Model*. A national army was created, the Continental Army, but it provided mainly central leadership and supply. The actual fighting force was principally composed of state units, made available to the Continental Army. Some states, including Massachusetts, had used selective military drafts to raise those units.<sup>56</sup>

The model that Chambers calls the *New Nation* format was in effect between the War of Independence and World War I, though with important variations during the Civil War. The *New Nation* format had three principal components: (1) a small, professional standing national army (Regular Army); (2) standing state militias, numerically larger than the national army, but much less effective; and (3) ad hoc volunteer forces to augment temporarily either or both the national army and the state forces. The volunteers to federal service during that time span were called the U. S. Volunteers. The standing army served principally as a frontier constabulary and later on the imperial periphery. The militias-formally renamed the "National Guard" by the Militia Act of 1903-were permanent, paid, and usually part-time soldiers used in local defense and subject to call to

federal service when needed. The ad hoc volunteers, whether to the militias/National Guard or to the U. S. Volunteers, were short-term soldiers, recruited by financial incentives and patriotic appeals to serve for a particular campaign or war.<sup>57</sup>

In the War of 1812, land forces consisted of an expanded Regular Army and musters of the state militias. Under the leadership of Regular Army officers and accompanied by a few Regular Army soldiers, state militias provided most of the soldiers for invasions of Canada and for defensive battles in several areas including on the Canadian border, in the Mid-Atlantic region, and at the mouth of the Mississippi River. In the Battle of New Orleans, on-the-spot volunteers also joined the battle. Although the United States was able to achieve a *status quo ante bellum* result, the War of 1812 showed the weakness of the dual system of shared federal-state control of troops. Vermont, for example, tried to prevent its militia from being used in New York State. Commanders often did not know the soldiers beyond their own units, since training and combat service were largely unrelated. Further, the fighting quality of the troops was uneven and often untested.<sup>58</sup>

The Mexican War was triggered in part by the placement of Regular Army forces along the disputed border between Mexico and the recently annexed Texas. When war came, the forty-two-thousand-man Regular Army was augmented by sixty-one thousand U. S. Volunteers. Those federal forces successfully invaded Mexico. Twelve thousand state militia troops, mainly from Texas and Louisiana, were also called to federal in those states for garrison duty and in support of the invasion.<sup>59</sup>

The *New Nation Model* was used by both the North and the South in the American Civil War, but with an important variation – drafts by the two central

authorities. When the Civil War began, the Confederacy lacked a central army, but it had the loyalty of a significant cadre of officers with Regular Army training and experience. Early Confederate military success won mainly by state militia units could not long obscure that fact that the South faced a difficult challenge in matching the numbers of soldiers that the Union could, in theory, mobilize. The problem was made more difficult because the Confederacy was founded on the principal of states' rights, limiting the central government's ability to control the availability of units from states' militias for field service. Of course, the Confederacy was unwilling to put slaves under arms, further limiting available manpower. Faced with these limitations, and as volunteerism faded, the Confederacy adopted a draft in April, 1862. The Confederate draft was largely a force-retention measure. Since every military-aged white man was subject to the draft for the duration of the war, there was little advantage in leaving the army once enlisted. At first, the Confederate draft permitted paid substitution, but the price climbed sharply and substitution was prohibited. The draft did contain very extensive occupational exemptions so that the small and fragile Southern economy could be kept running. By the end of the war, the Confederacy was able to field a total of about one million men, although it never had a quarter of that number under arms at any one time. Only about 20 percent of the total forces raised were draftees, the retention incentives of the draft having helped preserve the force level.<sup>60</sup>

The North had a large advantage in men of fighting age, making the effective use of that resource critical to Union victory. The Union had only sixteen thousand men in the Regular Army when the war began. That small force was scattered across the continent, mainly along the Western Frontier. In addition, the Union could call upon the

northern states' militia units. Massachusetts, for example, had five thousand men under arms, and answered Lincoln's April, 1861 call for seventy-five thousand men from the state militias. In July, Lincoln called for another six hundred thousand men to join the U. S. Volunteers, apportioning his request among the several states. As in the Confederacy, the volunteerism of the early war faded in the North. Several states turned to their own drafts to maintain the strength of their militia units in federal service, and to meet their apportionments of volunteers for the U. S. Volunteers. The draft at the national level, though, faced formidable political opposition from the Democrats still in the Federal Congress. The Lincoln administration turned to the draft only after enlistment bonuses and other incentives failed to raise sufficient numbers. The administration's draft bill was presented in late-winter, 1863 by Senator Henry Wilson, a Republican from Massachusetts. It was adopted on a voice vote in the Senate and by a vote of 115-49 in the House of Representatives on March 13, 1863.<sup>61</sup>

The Civil War draft had exemptions for physical, mental or moral unfitness. It also exempted men who would leave dependents behind if they were called to service, but the exemption was narrowly defined. Also, an amendment to the law adopted in 1864 made so-called "declarant aliens," those who had declared their intention to become citizens, subject to the draft. Declarant aliens who refused to serve were threatened with a loss of later opportunity to become American citizens. Of course, many foreign-born men, American citizens or not, fought. The Union Army was about 25 percent foreign-born. For the Civil War, as with the World War I draft, the basic organizational unit was the local "Exemption Board." Each board was composed of three members, appointed by the President, including a medical doctor. During the Civil War, draft boards included a

provost marshal, who was a serving military officer. Enforcement of the draft, resistance to which was a federal crime, was provided by the military itself, with the provost marshal who sat on the board in charge of local enforcement. Thus, a uniformed army officer played a role in deciding who would be called to service, and uniformed soldiers under his command, would be available to force reluctant draftees into the army.<sup>62</sup>

An important negative lesson from the Civil War draft drawn by the designers of the World War I draft related to the purchase of exemptions and of hired substitutes. For \$300, a selected man could buy exemption. Alternatively, a man could pay someone to take his place. To keep the substitution option at least theoretically available to men who were not rich, and doubtless having learned from the sharp rise in the cost of substitutes in the Confederacy, the Union draft law limited the amount that a man wanting to avoid the draft could pay a substitute. Still, the use of money in whatever form to avoid service gave the appearance and the reality that it was a “rich man’s war, a poor man’s fight.”<sup>63</sup>

The adoption of the Union draft in 1863 was met with strong resistance. Most famously, New York City exploded in three days of some of the worst rioting in American history. Most of the rioters were Irish laborers who saw no good reason to risk their lives for the freedom of blacks who would become competitors for jobs and housing. The rioters made blacks a particular target, with many killed. Around one thousand people were killed or injured before troops arrived.<sup>64</sup>

On the operational level, the draft was not very effective; the first draft for three hundred thousand men produced only around ten thousand actual enlistments. By the end of the war, only about 2 percent of the 2.1 million men who served in the Union Army were draftees; another 6 percent were paid substitutes for would-be draftees.<sup>65</sup>

In Chambers' analysis, the *New Nation Model* continued to be followed after the Civil War, without the need for a draft. When the Spanish-American War required large and more varied forces, the navy responded at sea, and the sixty-thousand-man Regular Army grew to two hundred sixty thousand by the addition of the U.S. Volunteers. Those land forces acted in the Caribbean and conquered the Philippines, where the U. S. Volunteers were the principal force. Of the two hundred thousand to three hundred thousand soldiers who served, almost all were volunteers who joined either the state National Guard units or the U.S. Volunteers specifically for that war.<sup>66</sup>

The additional territory acquired in the Spanish-American War added to the growing American imperial presence, with Hawaii and the Canal Zone soon to follow. Bringing the non-white populations of those areas under American jurisdiction complicated the nativist image of the real America as an Anglo-Saxon nation. On the military side, the American Navy and Marines grew to patrol that empire. The Navy, even with the addition of marine detachments, was essentially a commitment of financial capital, rather than of significant manpower. The eighty thousand man post-Spanish-American War Regular Army, while enough to be an imperial constabulary, was not the mass army that American imperialists thought the United States needed to become a Great Power with a world-wide presence, comparable to the European empires. For World War I, the United States created an army of nearly four million men, 72 percent of whom were draftees. In Chambers' analysis, this mass mobilization was made possible by the adoption of the *Nation-State Model*. That model would be American's military manpower system for sixty years.<sup>67</sup>

Between the turn of the twentieth century and the entry of the United States into World War I, a major political struggle took place regarding the future of the American military. The most basic question was how the United States could create a military system that was compatible with the principle of individual liberty and which was politically possible, but which was also effective for the foreign policy goals of the administrations of the coming years. The raised two other questions: (1) What was the military obligation of citizenship? And (2) How and to what extent were citizens to be turned into soldiers? From the earliest days of colonial life, the principle of the community-at-arms had existed. That view was part of an obligation-based view of citizenship. In the Progressive Era, the ethos developed of an activist government, intervening in society on the side of certain segments of the population perceived as needing help. “Needing help” easily changed into “entitled to help,” and a rights-based view of citizenship emerged. Through it all runs the American tradition of individual liberty. How could a mass military fit into that kind of society? Put more simply: Was military conscription consistent with American democracy?<sup>68</sup>

Both within the military and on the civilian side, there were those supporting radical reform of the military. They were devotees of the views of post-Civil War military theorist Emory Upton. The “Uptonians” argued that only massive advance preparation could meet the needs of modern warfare. On the military side, the Uptonians included Major General Leonard P. Wood and Major General Hugh L. Scott. Civilian leadership included former President Theodore Roosevelt, but also included prominent Eastern-elite leaders like Massachusetts Republican Congressman Augustus P. Gardner, son-in-law of Senator Henry Cabot Lodge and representative of a district that included

Beverly. In general, the financial support for the military reform and later for the Preparedness movement came from very successful Eastern industrialists and merchants who supported a strong America playing a prominent part in international affairs. These men were heavily involved in international finance and commerce, with especially strong ties to Great Britain.

The first success of the Uptonians was the creation in 1903 of an Army Chief of Staff, with a central Army General Staff under his command. For the first time, the disparate and often feuding parts of the Regular Army (e. g. Quartermaster, Corp of Engineers, Ordinance, etc.) were put under effective unified leadership. That central leadership also gave the Army capacity for strategic planning and training.<sup>69</sup>

The Uptonians had two particular targets: the National Guard and the U. S. Volunteers. The modernizers believed that the National Guard was poorly trained and lacked the professionalism to meet the needs of a strong national state with imperial possessions. Further, they believed that the U. S. Volunteers was little better. They believed that with ad hoc volunteers training would always be rushed and inconsistent, and the quality and the quantity of volunteers were inevitably uncertain.<sup>70</sup>

The Uptonians faced significant challenges. To begin with, most Americans, even when war began in Europe, saw no need for major military reorganization. Most believed that the traditional structure of Regular Army-National Guard, augmented by ad hoc volunteers, had worked well enough in the past. Some feared the danger of militarism and tyranny they perceived in an exclusively federally-controlled army. More powerful than those general attitudes was the very active opposition of the supporters of the National Guard. Supporters of the Guard lobbied for the 1908 Militia Act which strengthened the

Guard by expanding its availability for federal use by extending to a year potential federalization and by purporting to legalize the use of the Guard outside the United States.<sup>71</sup>

The Uptonians proposed a manpower solution that, in their view, would solve both the recruitment issue and resolve the question of role of the National Guard. They called for universal military training (UMT.) The United States was hardly the first country to consider such an approach. Ever since the *levee en masse* of Napoleonic times, the European powers wanted mass armies in times of war, without being bankrupted by the cost of maintaining them in times of peace. Great Britain relied on imperial manpower to fight its wars, but the continental powers turned to UMT. Under such a system, every able-bodied young man spent time-usually a year-in the military, being trained by a permanent, standing military cadre. The newly-trained soldiers would then return to civilian life, as a reserve subject to mobilization in time of need. The system had the advantages of providing a trained, readily available force to use the weapons that had been stockpiled without the cost of a large permanent standing force, or having the potential threat to civil authority that a large army could present. One of the important disadvantages of UMT was that it took days or even weeks to gather forces in a crisis, which created strong pressure to mobilize in anticipation of need.<sup>72</sup>

Under the influence of General Wood, the Uptonians within the military proposed UMT that would every year give hundreds of thousands of eighteen-year-old men six months of military training by Regular Army officers. In 1913, Wood arranged prototype training camps with the cooperation of several college presidents. The supporters of the system also argued that UMT would serve as a tool of assimilation. There was not,

though, political support for adopting so radical a change. Opposition came both those who supported the National Guard and from those who saw in the proposal the danger of rising militarism.<sup>73</sup>

With the coming of war in Europe, civilian political leaders who had opposed UMT agreed that a major overhaul of the military was needed. Wilson's political opponents, led by Roosevelt, criticized the administration for what they believed was the lack of readiness for war. At first, Wilson did not support UMT, and blocked serving military personnel from speaking or acting in support of it. Civilian organizations like the National Security League and the Military Camps Training Association continued campaigning for UMT. The latter group, known as "Plattsburgers" after the location of the first of the privately-run camps that they established, was made up of affluent Eastern elites who were sympathetic to Great Britain. By 1916, the Plattsburgers had established a dozen camps and were training tens of thousands of young men, mainly the sons of the elite Easterners who supported the movement. Still, with the war far away, most Americans were not in favor of UMT or conscription.<sup>74</sup>

Preparedness became one of the major political issues of the day. Under increasing political pressure and seeing an increasing likelihood of American intervention, Wilson proposed his own plan for "moderate" military preparedness in 1915. He called for an expansion of the Regular Army from one hundred eight thousand to one hundred forty-two thousand. In addition, he called for a new four hundred thousand-man "Continental Army," volunteers who would receive two months of Plattsburg-style training from Regular Army and Plattsburg-trained officers. After their training, the volunteers would be on ready-reserve for three years. Competing plans for

modernization were soon presented. Behind the scenes the Army General Staff prepared an “unofficial” plan for an expansion of the Regular Army to two hundred fifty thousand men, with a fully trained two hundred fifty thousand man reserve force. Also included were plans to add an additional five hundred thousand men after nine months of training. Yet another plan was proposed in Congress by Representative James Hay. He agreed with Wilson on the Regular Army expansion, but proposed expanding the National Guard to take the place of Wilson’s Continental Army. The debate was a continuation of the struggle between supporters of the Regular Army and those who favored the National Guard. Wilson was unable to get support for his plan. In addition, pacifists and agrarian interests opposed all of the expansion proposals as steps on the road to militarism and war.<sup>75</sup>

Although Eastern elites like the Plattsburgers favored intervention, most Americans did not want to join the European fighting. Emotional ties of Anglo-descended Americans, British propaganda and the financial interests of the Eastern elites strengthened a pro-British attitude in most of the country. Many millions of Americans, though, opposed helping the British or Russian Governments. Polish immigrants had fled what they viewed as Czarist oppression. The Poles had little interest in helping Russia, despite the February Revolution there. Irish immigrants and their descendants bitterly resented Britain’s long rule, and especially the brutal suppression of the Easter Monday Rising in 1916. Further, many of German birth or decent did not want to make war on their ancestral homeland. In addition, many of all backgrounds were suspicious that entry into the war was to benefit the wealthy Easterners. Wilson’s Progressive supporters within the Democratic Party split on both the question entry into the war and the question

of instituting a military draft. For many Progressives, intervention into the war was a logical extension of the domestic interventionism that was the heart of Progressive philosophy. Other Progressives were very lukewarm on both fighting in the war and doing so with a conscript army. Finally, other Progressives opposed both because of the risk of militarism and of class discrimination that might exist in a draft. With a splintered Congress far from consensus, the issue was put aside.<sup>76</sup>

The issue did not stay on the back-burner for long; a military challenge much closer than the European war soon got Washington's attention. Ongoing turmoil in Mexico spilled over into Arizona in the spring of 1916, when Pancho Villa launched a raid that killed nine Americans. Wilson sent five thousand Regular Army troops. A second raid prompted the passage of a National Defense Act (NDA of 1916) that included an expansion of the Regular Army from an authorized strength of one hundred seventy-five thousand to nearly three hundred thousand over five years. The NDA of 1916 also declared that men eighteen to forty-five years had an obligation to serve in the military, if needed. It also gave the administration vague authority to create a military draft. The NDA of 1916 authorized an increase in National Guard strength, and empowered the President to call National Guard units directly into Regular Army forces. Wilson used the provision to draft one hundred thousand National Guard troops into federal service for what proved to be an ineffective punitive expedition into Mexico. While the expedition was mounted, it became clear that there would be no rapid rush of volunteers to meet the need if a mass army was needed for a general war. In this unexpected dress rehearsal for war, neither the National Guard nor Regular Army performed well in a campaign that accomplished very little.<sup>77</sup>

Throughout 1916, Preparedness advocates mounted one of the first modern public relations campaigns in support of increasing the size of the American military, in general, and in favor of adopting a universal training system in particular. UMT was supported by different groups for different reasons; doctors saw health care advantages, business interests saw a more predictable workforce, and educators saw an opportunity to instill patriotism. The nation remained divided; even the Republicans, generally pro-preparedness, choose not to support a draft in their 1916 party platform. In the fall elections, Wilson, who “kept us out of war,” was re-elected, and the Democrats, including many members opposed to both the war and to conscription, retained control of both Houses of Congress.<sup>78</sup>

International events forced resolution of the internal debates. First, in January, 1917 the British intercepted and later published a German dispatch encouraging Mexico to attack the United States. Before the existence of the so-called Zimmerman Telegram became public in March, other events had brought the United States to the brink of war. On February 1, the German Government resumed submarine warfare attacks on unwarned civilian trade, which led to the severing of diplomatic relations. The developments quickly changed the political debate from a theoretical discussion of appropriate military recruitment policy and structure to a very practical question of how to mobilize for the war that seemed imminent. Should volunteers continue to be the supplement to forces, or should a draft be adopted? While the Army General Staff had supported UMT in the pre-1917 debates, they let it be known unofficially that a selective draft was acceptable.<sup>79</sup>

With the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare, Wilson decided that the United States must enter the war. At that point, in February, 1917, Wilson believed an American force just over a million men would be sufficient. He envisioned that force as composed of a Regular Army expanded to around six hundred thousand, accompanied by around six hundred thousand U. S. Volunteers and National Guard troops called to federal service. The administration believed that size forces, coupled with American production and financing, would be enough to help the Allies and to give the United States a role in peace talks, whenever they should occur. Wilson directed Secretary of War Newton Baker to write a bill that would give the President extensive war-making powers. Baker gave the job to General Enoch H. Crowder. Although the particular bill was never submitted to Congress, it was another step to both war and the draft, which General Crowder would be appointed to administer. Also in February, the Army War College submitted a plan for a four million-man army, which would have to be created by a draft in the current emergency. The General Staff thought a smaller American fighting force on the ground in Europe would be sufficient to meet the Allies needs, and that a reserve force of some two-and-half million could be raised and trained through UMT. Major General Tasker H. Bliss called for a selective service draft, with training to follow induction.<sup>80</sup>

On March 21, 1917, Wilson called Congress into Special Session, scheduled for April 4, to request a Declaration of War. As he did so, he had still not decided whether a military draft was needed. As late as March 26, Wilson told his critical advisors on military policy, Baker and Crowder, that he was opposed to a draft. At that time, the land forces available to Wilson were about one hundred twenty thousand Regular Army

soldiers and about one hundred eighty thousand National Guardsmen. At full authorized strength those forces would total around five hundred thousand. In addition, Wilson believed that as many as a million volunteers would come forward. The administration planned to send a small expeditionary force immediately after the Declaration of War for demonstration and planning purposes. However, they did not believe that the main American Army would be available before mid-1918. Wilson still believed those forces, would be sufficient to meet the needs of the Allies. By April 6, when the Army Bill was sent to Congress, he decided that the mass army that would eventually be needed should be created using a draft. What caused his change of mind has been examined by historians, but the resolution of the question is clouded by the varying accounts of the critical participants, Wilson, Baker and Crowder. What can be gleaned from the records is that between March 26 and March 28 or March 29, Wilson decided upon a selective military draft.<sup>81</sup>

Why did President Wilson reverse his long-standing opposition to the draft, especially in the face of expected opposition from his own political party in Congress and the country? While the reasons were complex, in the end it probably came down to politics.

Previously, Wilson had not been persuaded by the arguments in favor of draft made by Baker and the Preparedness Movement. Conscription advocates pointed first to the experience of Great Britain. At the start of the war, Britain relied on volunteers. A great wave of patriotism enabled the rapid enrollment of "Kitchener's Million," with later campaigns also succeeding. Soon, though, the terrible carnage of the war consumed the early volunteers and discouraged later ones. Worse still, the early volunteers were sorely

missed in civilian society and in the economy. In Britain, the first wave of volunteers often included so-called Pals Brigades, men associated in civil life who volunteered together. All too often, they died together, sometimes in a single attack. This kind of loss not only had devastating personal effects on grieving communities, but important economic impact. When, for example, all the lathe operators in a town volunteered together, and died together, the town had no lathe operators left, which impeded war production. Stung by that kind of effect, Britain adopted a draft in 1916.<sup>82</sup>

American conscriptionists argued that the government should be in the position of deciding how each man could best serve the war effort. Further, the sudden creation of a mass army would be logistically very complex; how would the new recruits be fed, housed, trained, equipped, and transported? A draft would allow a control of the flow of manpower into the system at the rate troops could be handled, and at the rate they were needed. The British experience also emphasized the real possibility that, after an early wave, enough volunteers simply would not be forthcoming.<sup>83</sup>

These were familiar arguments; another factor likely tipped the scale for Wilson: “Colonel” Roosevelt, as everyone called the former president at the time. As soon as the German resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare made United States entry into the war seem likely, Roosevelt began planning to raise and command a volunteer force of a division or more. As recently as the Civil War, political leaders had raised, paid for and commanded military units, though nobody had done so on the scale that Roosevelt offered. In March, 1917 Roosevelt went so far as to request a commission from Baker, who refused. Roosevelt’s March 23 reply to the refusal amounted to saying that, as a former Commander-in-Chief, he was essentially entitled to a commission. That reply

certainly angered Baker and likely Wilson. The exchange did more than anger the administration; it created the specter of Roosevelt, viewed by the administration as unqualified and unreliable, in Europe as virtually an independent force, interfering both with the fighting and with a post-war settlement. Further, Roosevelt might attract officers whom the Regular Army wanted under its own control. The administration may well have concluded that, if Roosevelt's volunteers were unacceptable, volunteerism itself must end. It is clear that the exchange with Roosevelt occurred almost simultaneously with Wilson's abrupt change of position on the draft.<sup>84</sup>

The Army Bill that Wilson submitted as soon as war was declared on April 6 called for building the Regular Army and the National Guard, whose members would be drafted to federal service, to their authorized sizes totaling just short of seven hundred fifty thousand men, mainly with anticipated volunteers. Beyond those men, the administration wanted no volunteers. Instead, a new "National Army" of a million men would be created in two equal stages by use of a federal selective draft from nineteen to twenty-five year old men. It would exempt aliens, religious objectors and certain others. The most numerous exemptions would be for those who would leave unsupported dependents behind if they were called to serve in the Army. Further, the draft would be only for the duration of the war and would allow the government to marshal the nation's manpower resources in the best way to support the war effort.<sup>85</sup>

Reaction to Wilson's draft proposal ranged from strong to outright opposition. The Preparedness advocates were pleased with Wilson's proposal, and most of the nation's newspapers supported it. Even the immigrant groups who had not favored the Allies did not oppose the draft, at least in part because they feared their loyalty to

America would be questioned if they did so. Black leaders supported the proposal for a draft; hoping military service would strengthen their claims for equal rights. Many thought that the draft would merely spur volunteers. One senator was even surprised that an actual combat role for American troops was contemplated. Senator Thomas S. Martin asked an Army spokesman during hearings on the draft bill, “Good Lord! You’re not going to send soldiers over there, are you?”<sup>86</sup>

In both the House and the Senate, opposition quickly arose to the draft, though even opponents called for national unity. Populist and agrarian interests in the South and in the West saw the hand of Eastern big business in the United States entry and therefore opposed the draft. Some opponents of the draft believed that the traditional volunteer system should be given the chance to produce the needed forces. Many remembered the bitter experience of the Civil War draft. Speaker of the House James “Champ” Clark was sharply criticized for comparing the military draftee to a criminal convict. On the liberal wing of Wilson’s party, Jane Addams, spokeswoman of the Settlement House Movement, and Roger Baldwin, who would later found the American Civil Liberties Union, opposed the militarism they perceived in the war and in the draft.<sup>87</sup>

Two critical questions dominated the discussion and debate on the Army Bill: 1) Would the bill include volunteers? and 2) What role, if any, would Roosevelt play?

Although Wilson’s Democratic Party held the majority in both the House and the Senate, key leaders in his own party opposed the draft. Republican Congressman Julius Kahn, himself a German immigrant, led the floor fight for the Army Bill. In addition to Speaker Clark, the important Democratic opponents were the Chair and Vice Chair of the House Military Affairs, Representatives Dent and Anthony, respectively. They each

offered an alternative to the administration proposal. One bill would have required a five-month trial of volunteerism before a draft could be instituted; another would add that if and only if volunteerism failed to produce enough men, a draftee army purely for home defense could be created with only volunteers going to Europe. Wilson was heavily involved in persuading reluctant legislators to go along with the draft, meeting directly with the opponents of conscription on several occasions. At the same time, public sentiment was strongly pressuring legislators to support the president. Great parades and other displays highlighted Patriot's Day celebrations across the country.<sup>88</sup>

The climax of legislative battle for the draft came in the House of Representatives in April 28. A challenge to the draft from the supporters of volunteerism was defeated 279-98, and the president's bill, with amendments, was adopted by votes of 374-24 in the House and 81-8 in the Senate.<sup>89</sup>

Although the bill had passed, there were, as typical with any legislation, differences that had to be resolved by a Conference Committee. The most important difference was the role, if any, that Roosevelt would play in the recruitment of the army and its use in Europe. Roosevelt had not given up. He had lobbied Congress to require the president to accept him and his claimed hundreds of thousands of volunteers. He even visited the White House to make his case. The Senate supported a special provision for Roosevelt, but the House initially rejected it. The Conference Committee began its work on May 3, with everyone expecting a rapid agreement. Although the other issues also divided the Conference Committee, including what ages to draft and the question of prohibition, the "Roosevelt Volunteers" were the major stumbling block. Initially, the Senate held to its pro-Roosevelt position, but the House conferees were adamant. On

May 11, the Conference Committee reported back to the two chambers a bill that compromised the age issue, included prohibition and did not include provision for Roosevelt. Then, to everyone's surprise, the House, which had rejected the provision for Roosevelt 170 to 106, approved a provision by a vote of 215 to 178 that would authorize Wilson to accept up to four divisions of volunteers from anyone. Everyone understood that the purpose was to make room for Roosevelt. The bill was adopted finally by both the House and the Senate, including the provision for the Roosevelt Volunteers provision. In the meantime, Roosevelt had been actively recruiting. He was reported to have raised as many as two hundred thousand men. Governor Whitman of New York even offered to commission him a Major General in that state's National Guard. In the end, it all did not matter; Wilson commended Roosevelt for his career of service, but declined to include him or any volunteers raised by him in the army.<sup>90</sup>

Although the administration's proposal was adopted, Congress did make significant changes before the draft became law. Critics thought that nineteen years old was too young to subject a man to the draft. Ultimately, the age was changed to twenty-one to thirty, though before the end of the war, the draft age range became nineteen to forty-five. Largely because the war ended abruptly, virtually nobody under twenty-one or over thirty saw European service as a result of the draft. Also, spokesmen in Congress for agrarian interests insisted that food production would be crippled without an agricultural exemption. That was answered by giving the president broad power to make regulations, including occupational exemptions. Also, Congress made certain that no paid substitutes for draftees would exist in World War I as they had in the Civil War. In addition, Congress increased military pay, provide insurance and provided for direct payments to

soldiers families, creating a pattern for government benefits for years to come. In a nod to temperance and moralizing elements, Congress also prohibited brothels and alcohol sales near military encampments. With regard to the draft itself, Congress also added an appeals system, ultimately leading to the president himself. No appeal actually reached the president. Wilson signed the bill on May 17, 1917, and quickly set June 5 as the first Registration Day.<sup>91</sup>

The long-standing tradition of a volunteer-based war-time force was abandoned in 1917 for three reasons. First, the Republicans in Congress were readily willing to support the increase in power of both the central government at home and the country on the international stage that the draft represented. Second, the strong and growing pressure from constituents and newspapers proved too much for many legislators who had initially opposed a draft to resist. Third, and most important, Wilson's powerful and persuasive direct involvement in the legislative process convinced many legislators, especially in his own party, that support of the draft was essential to presenting a unified front to the world.

Some who had opposed the draft feared that it would not be administered fairly in a country divided along ethnic lines, with a virulent ongoing anti-immigrant campaign in progress. That fear, combined with the memory of the largely-failed Civil War draft, made success of the new draft far from certain.

### Chapter 3. Uncle Sam Wants (Some of) You

Such draft ... shall be based upon liability to military service of all male citizens, or male persons not enemy aliens who have declared their intention to become citizens, between the ages of twenty-one and thirty years...

Army Bill of 1917<sup>92</sup>

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<sup>92</sup>Notes to Chapter 3

*Army Bill of 1917*: 76, 77-78. That statute dealt with topics other than the draft, but for simplicity sake the entire enactment will be referred to, as it was at the time, and cited as the Army Bill or the *Army Bill of 1917*. Because it has been superseded and repealed, the statute does not appear in the United States Code. All page citations to the *Army Bill* are to *U.S. Statutes at Large*.

<sup>54</sup> "President Calls For War Declaration," *New York Times*, (hereafter *NYT*), April 3, 1917. "Congress Passes Draft Bill," *NYT*, April 29, 1917.

<sup>55</sup> "The Call to the Colors" National Geographic magazine April, 1917, 345-361. Arthur S. Link et al., ed., *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), vol. 42, 181.

<sup>56</sup> *An Act To promote the efficiency of the militia, and for other purposes*, (popularly called the Dick Act), Public Law 57-33, *U. S. Statutes at Large* 32 (1903): 775. Chambers, *To Raise an Army*, 6, 20.

<sup>57</sup> Chambers, *To Raise an Army*, 29.

<sup>58</sup> Chambers, *To Raise an Army*, 32. Segal, *Recruiting for Uncle Sam*, 23.

<sup>59</sup> Chambers, *To Raise an Army*, 36. Segal, *Recruiting for Uncle Sam*, 24.

<sup>60</sup> Chambers, *To Raise an Army*, 45-46, 6, 180. Segal, *Recruiting for Uncle Sam*, 25.

<sup>61</sup> Chambers, *To Raise an Army*, 39-57 passim.

<sup>62</sup> *An Act for enrolling and calling out the national Forces, and for other purposes*, 37<sup>th</sup> Congress, Chapter 75, *U. S. Statutes at Large* 12 (1863), (hereafter *Union Civil War Draft*): 731-732.

<sup>63</sup> Chambers, *To Raise an Army*, 52. Segal, *Recruiting for Uncle Sam*, 25.

<sup>64</sup> Doris Kearns Goodwin, *Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005), 537.

<sup>65</sup> Chambers, *To Raise an Army*, 57, 62. Segal, *Recruiting for Uncle Sam*, 26.

<sup>66</sup> Chambers, *To Raise an Army*, 67. Segal, *Recruiting for Uncle Sam*, 26-27.

<sup>67</sup> Chambers, *To Raise an Army*, 73, 76, 79.

The statute that created the World War I draft, the Army Bill of 1917, was a major extension of the power of the federal government into American society. That extension, temporary as it was, provided patterns of federal action for later years. Using pre-existing civilian governmental structures, and largely staffed by pre-existing civilian leaders, the draft system created under the Army Bill put familiar local faces on what was in fact a great extension of federal power. The Army Bill was a victory for the Uptonians, military

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<sup>68</sup> Capozzola, *Uncle Sam Wants You*, 6. Chambers, *To Raise an Army*, viii. Segal, *Recruiting for Uncle Sam*, 1.

<sup>69</sup> *An Act To increase the efficiency of the Army*, Public Law 57-88, *U. S. Statutes at Large* 32 (1903): 830.

<sup>70</sup> Chambers, *To Raise an Army*, 74, 77, 78, 86, 87-88. *Acts and Resolves, 1912*, c. 634 (Boston: Secretary of the Commonwealth, 1912). John Garry Clifford, *The Citizen Soldiers: The Plattsburg Training Camp Movement, 1913-1920* (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1972), (hereafter Clifford, *The Citizen Soldiers*), 200.

<sup>71</sup> *An Act To further amend the Act entitled "An Act to promote the efficiency of the militia, and for other purposes," approved January twenty-first, nineteen hundred and three*, Public Law 60-145, *U. S. Statutes at Large* 35 (1908), 399. Segal, *Recruiting for Uncle Sam*, 3.

<sup>72</sup> Chambers, *To Raise An Army*, 74, 89. Segal, *Recruiting for Uncle Sam*, 21. More cites needed on European UMTs.

<sup>73</sup> Chambers, *To Raise an Army*, 75, 79, 80, 81, 84. Clifford, *The Citizen Soldiers*, 30. Joe F. Decker, "The Progressive Era and the World War I Draft," in "The Progressive Era," special issue, *OAH Magazine of History* 1, no ¾ (Winter-Spring, 1986), (hereafter Decker, "The Progressive Era and the World War I Draft"): 15.

<sup>74</sup> Capozzola, *Uncle Sam Wants You*, 8. Chambers, *To Raise an Army*, 105, 108. Edward Coffman, *The War To End All Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I* (1968; Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1998), (hereafter Coffman, *The War To End All Wars*), Kindle ed., 14-15. Jennifer D. Keene, *World War I; The American Soldier Experience* (Lincoln, NB: University of Nebraska Press, 2011), (hereafter Keene, *World War I*), 6-7, 8. Kennedy, *Over Here*, 22.

<sup>75</sup> Capozzola, *Uncle Sam Wants You*), 25. Chambers, *To Raise an Army*, 103, 105, 106, 109, 113, 114. Keene, *World War I*, 8. Kennedy, *Over Here*, 18. "The Citizen Army of Switzerland," *National Geographic Magazine*, November, 1915, 593.

<sup>76</sup> Capozzola, *Uncle Sam Wants You*, 8. Chambers, *To Raise an Army*, 114, 175. Decker, "The Progressive Era and the World War I Draft": 15.

<sup>77</sup> Chambers, *To Raise an Army*, 115, 117-118. Coffman, *The War To End All Wars*, 13. Segal, *Recruiting for Uncle Sam*, 28. *National Defense Act of 1916*, (hereafter *NDA of 1916*), Public Law 65-13, *U. S. Statutes at Large* 39 (1916), 166

<sup>78</sup> Chambers, *To Raise An Army*, 118, 119, 120, 121, 137. Kennedy, *Over Here*, 13.

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reformers who supported a federal force, recruited by use of a military draft. The victory, though, was of brief duration, lasting only a few months longer than the war emergency itself. What follows is a statutory analysis of the effect of the Army Bill on selecting and obtaining the soldiers for the World War I fighting force. The Army Bill dealt with topics

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John Whiteclay Chambers, II, "Decision for the Draft," in "World War I," special issue, *OAH Magazine of History* 17, no. 1 (Oct., 2002), (hereafter Chambers, "Decision for the Draft"): 27, 28. Chambers, *To Raise an Army*, 12, 125, 127. Keene, *World War I*, 9.

<sup>80</sup> Chambers, *To Raise an Army*, 129-132. Coffman, *The War To End All Wars*, 24. Keene, *World War I*, 11.

<sup>81</sup> Chambers, "Decision for the Draft": 27, 28. Chambers, *To Raise An Army*, 133, 134. Coffman, *The War To End All Wars*, 18. Kennedy, *Over Here*, 147.

<sup>82</sup> J. M. Winter, *The Experience of World War I* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 19.

<sup>83</sup> "Draft Bill Debate Is to Begin Today," *NYT*, April 23, 1917.

<sup>84</sup> Capozzola, *Uncle Sam Wants You*, 8. Chambers, "Decision for the Draft": 28. Keene, *Doughboys*, 4. Keene, *World War I*, 34. "Volunteers First, Roosevelt's Idea," *NYT*, April 16, 1917. "Wilson Says Draft Is Based on Service," *NYT*, April 20, 1917. "Quotes Baker's Plea for Selective Service," *NYT*, April 22, 1917. "Congress Votes on Draft Bill Today," *NYT*, April 28, 1917.

<sup>85</sup> Chambers, *To Raise an Army*, 11, 153, 154. Decker, "The Progressive Era and the World War I Draft": 15. "No Volunteer Units," *NYT*, April 8, 1917.

<sup>86</sup> Chambers, "Decision for the Draft": 17, 18. Chambers, *To Raise an Army*, 154, 156, 205. Coffman, *The War To End All Wars*, 15. Keene, *World War I*, 34.

<sup>87</sup> Decker, "The Progressive Era and the World War I Draft": 15. "Story of the Debate," April 5, 1917, *NYT*. "Conscription Feature of Army Bill Meets Opposition," *NYT*, April 10, 1917. "Anxiety Over Army Bill," *NYT*, April 12, 1917. "Draft Advocates Leading Opening Day of House Debate," *NYT*, April 24, 1917. "Clark In Debate Opposes Draft," *NYT*, April 26, 1917.

<sup>88</sup> "Anxiety Over Army Bill," *NYT*, April 12, 1917. "House Committee Against Draft Bill," *NYT*, April 17, 1917. "60,000 Paraders Stir Zeal of City For Call to War," *NYT*, April 20, 1917.

<sup>89</sup> "Congress Passes Draft Bill," *NYT*, April 29, 1917.

<sup>90</sup> "T.R. Off to Washington," *NYT*, April 2, 1917. "Congress Votes on Draft Bill," *NYT*, April 28, 1917. "Congress Passes Draft Bill," *NYT*, April 29, 1917, *NYT*. "Will Compromise Draft Conflicts," April 30, 1917, *NYT*. "Conscription Bill Sent to Conference," *NYT*, May 2, 1917. "200,000 Men Are Ready To Go With Roosevelt," *NYT*, May 7, 1917. "Report Draft Bill With Ages 21 to 30, Drop Roosevelt," *NYT*, May 11, 1917. "House for Roosevelt Division," *NYT*, May 13, 1917. "Roosevelt Wins Army Bill Point," *NYT*, May 16, 1917. "Offers Roosevelt a General's Rank," *NYT*, May 17, 1917. "President Calls the Nation to Arms," *NYT*, May 19, 1917.

other than the recruitment of the force for World War I. Those parts of the Bill are omitted below.<sup>93</sup>

The first critical feature of the statute appears in its formal title, *AN ACT to authorize the President to increase temporarily the Military Establishment of the United States*. The statute was an explicitly temporary war measure. The long-term resolution of the issues regarding the country's military would be debated again and again in future years. The temporal limitation upon the power given to the president reflected a long-term tradition. Throughout the history of the United States, the fear of a standing army had been strong, having been inherited from the English colonists, who remembered Cromwell's military dictatorship of the seventeenth century. That fear was embodied in the United States Constitution in two ways. First, Article I, Section 8, Clause 12 limited appropriations for support of the army to two years. With all of the House of Representatives and one-third of the Senate elected every two years, the provision guaranteed that the great majority of those voting money for an army would have recently faced the electorate, and would shortly have to do so again. An army that the electorate viewed as oppressive would not easily survive for very long. Second, Amendment II of the Constitution, written only a few years after a citizen-militia had started a successful revolution against the royal government, guaranteed that citizens could remain armed, against foreign or Native American danger, to be sure, but also against perceived government oppression that might occur under the new national government.<sup>94</sup>

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<sup>91</sup> Chambers, *To Raise an Army*, 161, 167, 169, 170, 173. Decker, "The Progressive Era and the World War I Draft": 16. Segal, *Recruiting for Uncle Sam*, 28.

<sup>93</sup> *Army Bill of 1917* §§ 2-5: 77-80.

<sup>94</sup> *Army Bill of 1917*, § 1 (*unnumbered*): 76. U.S. Constitution, art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 12. U.S. Constitution, amend. 2.

Section 1 of the Army Bill is not numbered as such, which was typical of the drafting style of the time. It contained three important provisions regarding military manpower: (1) it authorized a massive expansion of the land forces of the United States, (2) it created a military draft, and (3) it dealt with the vexing issue of former President Roosevelt and the troops he proposed to raise and lead in battle. The section was divided into seven “paragraphs,” most of which are several English-language paragraphs in length. (For clarity sake, these subdivisions will be designated with uppercase initial letters.) The First through Sixth Paragraphs authorized massive expansion of the army. The elements of the expansion included the immediate growth of the Regular Army from approximately one hundred twenty thousand men to two hundred ninety-eight thousand, the maximum strength allowed under the NDA of 1916. In addition, the members of the National Guard were drafted to the Regular Army, but the National Guard units themselves were not called to federal service. By drafting men, rather than calling up units, the statute avoided much of the controversy regarding the National Guard. As a practical matter, members of particular National Guard units were drafted to federal service simultaneously. For example, all the members of 1<sup>st</sup> Field Artillery of the Massachusetts National Guard became members of the 101<sup>st</sup> Field Artillery of the U. S. Regular Army.<sup>95</sup>

That the conscriptionist forces had defeated those who urged either the U. S. Volunteers or an expanded National Guard to meet the need for combat troops was made clear in the Third Paragraph. That Paragraph authorized a military draft to provide men for an additional immediate five hundred thousand-man expansion of the Regular Army. The provision does not specify that these men were to be additions to the Regular Army,

but there was no other force whose expansion beyond the NDA of 1916 forces was provided for by the statute. Further, these men were to be organized into divisions, brigades and so forth according to the manner of the Regular Army, using what is called the Table of Organization. In fact, these men become members of the Regular Army. The president was given very wide discretion regarding almost every aspect of the expansion that those men represented. Previously, Congress had kept very tight control on the composition and the organization of the military, right down to matters like the number of buglers in an infantry company (2) and the number of cooks in an artillery battery (3). At least for the duration of the war, the president was in complete control. Even as to the officers for the new troops, the president was given power to appoint whomever he wanted from virtually every imaginable source, although officers above the rank of colonel still required the advice and consent of the Senate.<sup>96</sup>

Further extending the president's great discretion over an addition five hundred thousand men to be raised, the Fourth Paragraph incorporated by reference all of the terms of the Third Paragraph. In a single enactment, the strength of the Regular Army had gone from an actual strength of about one hundred twenty thousand men to an authorized size of 1.3 million. That number was composed of the acceleration of the expansion to three hundred thousand authorized by the NDA of 1916, and the total of one million draftees authorized by the Third and Fourth Paragraphs of the Army Bill of 1917. In addition, the one hundred eighty thousand men who were members of the National Guard were available to be drafted. Before the war was over, the authorized strength of the Army would increase to over four million men.<sup>97</sup>

The Seventh Paragraph embodied the legislative resolution of a problem that had delayed the entire bill for three weeks-what to do about Roosevelt. In the end, the legislation gave the president the power, but not the obligation, to accept Roosevelt's putative division and others besides. Even in doing so, the Congress met some of the administration's objections to Roosevelt's proposal. Any such forces must be infantry. Fearing that potential Regular Army volunteers or potential draftees might gravitate to the Roosevelt force, the legislation prohibited enlistment in such a force of any man under twenty-five years old. Also, concerned that Roosevelt might actually raise some volunteers but that they would not be organized in a useful manner, the legislation required that any such volunteers be organized according to the Regular Army Table of Organization. Finally, to forestall any piecemeal presentation of Roosevelt volunteers, the Army Bill said that no unit smaller than a division could be accepted into service. Although it was said that Roosevelt was offering a division, it was estimated at the time that Roosevelt's offer translated into just short of thirty thousand men, more than the then-standard Table of Organization division. Finally, even if Roosevelt raised and President Wilson accepted the troops, it would still be up to the president, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to decide who would be their commander. In the end, it did not matter; as soon as he signed the Army Bill, Wilson announced that neither Colonel Roosevelt nor his troops were wanted.<sup>98</sup>

Section 2 detailed the structure of the military draft. First, in a nod to those who still wanted to try raising volunteers, the section called on the president to seek volunteers until he decided to do otherwise. Of course, the administration had already decided to use a draft to raise the million men needed for the expansion of the military authorized in the

Third and Fourth Paragraphs of Section 1 of the Army Bill. Closely read, the language of Section 2 showed that it was the Regular Army that was to expand, not the National Guard. The men recruited were “to raise and maintain the organizations of the Regular Army...as by this Act provided.” However, new recruits were merely “to complete and maintain the organizations embodying members of the National Guard.” New Regular Army units would be created, but no new National Guard units would be created. However, the state organizational structure of existing National Guard units was to be preserved, “so far as practicable,” as their members were drafted to federal service. Here was the final, if subtle, evidence that the Uptonians had won out over the advocates of the National Guard. The National Guard influence would not grow despite the great expansion of military force. Volunteerism was also sharply limited. Unless the president chose otherwise, nearly all the new soldiers could be recruited by means of a selective draft.<sup>99</sup>

Taken together, the provisions of the NDA of 1916 and the Army Bill of 1917 created the following army manpower situation in May, 1917. The Regular Army could immediately expand to a strength of nearly three hundred thousand men. This expansion could be by volunteers or by a selective draft, or any combination of the two, as the President determined. All of the then-enlisted members of the National Guard could be drafted to federal service, and their state unit designations could be used and brought up to strength, again with volunteers or draftees, as the President determined. Finally, the President could expand the Regular Army by a million men, all of whom were to be from a selective draft.

Section 2 then turned to the draft by which at least a million men were to be added to the Regular Army. The president was given broad power to make regulations, but many features of the draft were laid out in the statute.<sup>100</sup>

First, the class of individuals liable to be drafted was defined. Only men were subject to the draft. No trace of any discussion of drafting women has been found. Of course, thousands of women served with the American forces in World War I, as volunteers, mainly as nurses. The statute set the age range of potential draftees as twenty-one to thirty years, inclusive. In other words, a man was subject to the draft from the day of his twenty-first birthday until the day of his thirtieth birthday. Both ends of the age range would change in 1918.<sup>101</sup>

The most complex legal issue in deciding who was liable to be drafted was the status of foreign-born men. To examine this topic, it is important to be clear on the meaning of several terms. As used in this work, “citizen” means an individual born in the United States (or other indicated country) or a person who has completed the naturalization process proscribed by law; “alien” refers to an individual resident in a country of which he is not a citizen, subject or national; “declarant” refers to an alien who had made a formal declaration of the intention to become a citizen of the United States; a “non-declarant” refers to an alien who has not made such a declaration; “enemy alien” refers to an individual who was a citizen, subject or national of a country against which the United States had declared war, which in May, 1917 was only the German Empire. At the end of 1917, the Austro-Hungarian Empire would be declared an enemy state. All of its subjects, even ethnic minorities opposed to the imperial government, became “enemy aliens.” The term “Allied alien” refers to an individual who was a citizen, subject, or

national of one of the powers with whom the United States “associated” itself for purposes of World War I: the British Empire, the Russian Empire, the Kingdom of Italy, and the Republic of France. Another term that matters is “foreign-born,” which refers to an individual who had been born outside of the United States.<sup>102</sup>

The group of men subject to the draft consisted of citizens of the United States and declarant aliens. It made enemy aliens ineligible for the draft. As to the other groups defined above, the statute was silent. The actual implementation of the draft would create a situation that was more complicated. The first complication regarded individuals in the outlying possessions of the United States. In the 1910 census, those areas had a population of nearly ten million, 70 percent of whom were in the Philippines. The Army Bill was applicable to the “States, Territories, and the District of Columbia.” Alaska had become a Territory in 1912, and Hawaii had become one in 1900. Puerto Rico and the Philippines, though both conquered in the Spanish-American War, had different statuses in 1917, as did their residents. The residents of Puerto Rico were “citizens;” the residents of the Philippines were not. The NDA of 1916 had recognized a Puerto Rico Regiment of Infantry, but the other areas had no specific forces. Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico were subject to the draft, but no draft was conducted in the Philippines and the other outlying possessions.<sup>103</sup>

Making declarant aliens subject to the draft was not a new idea. The Union draft in the Civil War similarly extended to them. The enactors of the various draft laws believed that military service was part of the duties of a citizen, and that those who wanted to become citizens should be subject to that service. However, many foreign-born men had come to the United States specifically to avoid being drafted by one empire or

another. By the end of the war, declarant aliens would be given the opportunity to withdraw their declarations, thereby avoiding the draft. As a penalty, however, their opportunity for citizenship in the United States would be delayed.

Enemy aliens presented another set of complications. Not only were they not subject to the draft, they were actually ineligible to enlist in the Armed Forces of the United States. For many people this presented a problem. Many in the German-born population of the United States had neither become citizens. Still, they felt no loyalty to Germany and wanted to demonstrate their loyalty to the United States. The situation was even harder for many immigrants from the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. When war was declared against the Austria-Hungarian Empire at the end of 1917, men born in that Empire became enemy aliens, unless they had become citizens. Because they could not serve in the United States Army, a movement began to allow them to serve in the French Army, but the war ended before it came to fruition.<sup>104</sup>

A surprising problem arose with regard to men born in the Allied nations, some of whom were also declarants. When American draft boards sought to draft declarants who had been born in Allied countries, their home governments objected. In the end, the United States entered into agreements with Britain and Canada that allowed each country to apply its draft laws to its residents, regardless of their citizenship.<sup>105</sup>

Having defined the class of those subject to the selective draft, Section 2 then turned to the question of how the impact of that draft would be distributed across the country. Quotas were to be established on the basis of population for each state, the three territories, and the District of Columbia, and subdivisions thereof. In the regulations issued in July, 1917, the president set quotas only for each state, territory and the District

of Colombia. It was left to each governor to allocate those quotas among the subdivisions within their respective jurisdictions. The statutory metric of population also controlled that level of allocation.

The first task in setting actual numerical quotas was to determine how many men in total were to be raised. The draft worked through a series of calls for men. The size of the first call was determined by size of the force that the General Staff felt it could handle. The Army Bill had authorized a Regular Army of about 1.5 million men, including the one hundred eighty thousand members of the National Guard who could be drafted. The General Staff did not believe a force that size could be housed, fed and equipped for many months. After counting 1) the pre-war Regular Army, 2) the members of the National Guard who could be drafted, and 3) men who volunteered before the draft quotas were set in July, 1917, the General Staff determined that an additional six hundred eighty-seven thousand men should be raised in the first draft call. The statute, though, required that the quota for each area be credited with the number of men who were already in service, either because of pre-war enlistment or because they had volunteered since the United States entry. Therefore, the nation-wide quota was based on the total desired force size, not the number to be drafted. In that way, credit could be given to a jurisdiction for the number of its men already in service. Reducing an area's draft quota by the number of men already in service had been done in the Union Civil War draft as well. In the World War I draft, an allocation of the 1.3 million-man force that the General Staff decided upon for each state, territory and the District of Columbia was determined-the "gross quota." Then, an enlistment credit was subtracted to produce the number actually to be drafted in that jurisdiction-a "net quota." The process was then repeated for

each locality within the state or territory, and within the District of Columbia. In the end, each local board had a local numerical net quota to fulfill.<sup>106</sup>

While at first blush, the allocation by population may have seemed fair, it soon ran into problems. The root of the difficulty is that under the Army Bill the gross quota was based on the total population, but the liability to the draft was more limited, only males, only a certain age range, and, most importantly, only citizens and declarant aliens. Because the distribution of non-declarant aliens and of enemy aliens was not uniform

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<sup>106</sup> PMG, *First Report*, 15. *An Act for enrolling and calling out the national Forces, and for other purposes*, (hereafter *Union Draft Law*), Public Law 37-75, *U. S. Statutes at Large* 12 (1863): 731, 733.

<sup>95</sup> Crowder, *The Spirit of Selective*, 176. *NDA of 1916*, §24:182. *Volunteer Act of 1914*, Public Law 63-90, *U. S. Statutes at Large* 35 (1914): 347, § 8:349.

<sup>96</sup> *Army Bill of 1917*, § 1, ¶ 3: 76. *NDA of 1916*, § 17:178, § 18: 179.

<sup>97</sup> *Army Bill of 1917*, § 1, ¶ 4: 76-77.

<sup>98</sup> *Army Bill of 1917*, § 1, ¶ 7: 77. “Colonel’s Task A Big One,” *NYT*, April 21, 1917. “President Calls the Nation to Arms,” *NYT*, May 19, 1917.

<sup>99</sup> *Army Bill of 1917*, § 2: 77.

<sup>100</sup> *Army Bill of 1917*, § 2: 78.

<sup>101</sup> *Army Bill of 1917*, § 2: 78.

<sup>102</sup> *Joint Resolution Declaring that a state of war exists between the Imperial German Government and the Government and the people of the United States and making provision to prosecute the same*, S. J. Res. 1, 65<sup>th</sup> Cong. *U. S. Statutes at Large* 40 (1917): 1. *Joint Resolution Declaring that a state of war exists between the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government and the Government and the people of the United States, and making provision to prosecute the same*, H. J. Res. 169, 65<sup>th</sup> Cong. *U. S. Statutes at Large* 40 (1917): 429.

<sup>103</sup> U. S. Bureau of the Census, *1910 Census*, I, 22. PMG, *Final Report*, 396. Alaska, *An Act to create a legislative assembly in the Territory of Alaska, to confer legislative powers thereon, and for other purposes*, Public Law 62-334, *U. S. Statutes at Large* 37 (1912): 512. Hawaii, *An Act to provide a government for the Territory of Hawaii*, Public Law 56-331, *U. S. Statutes at Large* 31 (1900): 141. Puerto Rico, *An Act to provide a civil government for Porto Rico, and for other purposes*, Public Law 64-368, *U. S. Statutes at Large* 39 (1917): 951.

<sup>104</sup> Keene, *World War I*, 108.

<sup>105</sup> Provost Marshall General, *Selective Service Regulations: Prescribed by the President Under the Authority Vested in Him By the Terms of the Selective Service Law*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1918), 373.

across the United States, the burden of the draft did not fall evenly. In communities where there were many aliens excluded from the draft, the burden fell more heavily on those who were liable to be drafted. The problem was eventually addressed in 1918 by setting the quotas on the basis of the number of men eligible to be drafted, rather than on total population.<sup>107</sup>

The remainder of Section 2 gave the president authority to create special and technical units, recruited from volunteers if he so chose. It also encouraged the President to preserve the state identity of created units.

Section 3 was a very brief, but important provision. It prohibited enlistment bounties and paid substitutions. The mistake of mixing financial issues with conscription, made by both sides in the Civil War, would not be repeated in the World War I draft.<sup>108</sup>

Section 4 listed the statutory exemptions from draft liability. First, all federal officials were exempted. In addition, all officials of the states, territories, and those of the District of Columbia were made statutorily exempt from the draft. The rationale was that civil government should not be disrupted by the war. Wilson did not want the draft or a zeal for military service to disrupt civil government. Next, Section 4 exempted ordained and “regular” ministers. Of course, ministers could volunteer for the military. The president had the power to appoint chaplains under the NDA of 1916, § 15, though the number of chaplains who could be so appointed was limited. Section 4 then exempted divinity students who were preparing for the ministry at a recognized theological or divinity school at the time the Army Bill was passed.<sup>109</sup>

The Army Bill then exempted from the draft men who were already in the military or naval service. This may seem obvious, but in fact during the course of the war

conflicts would arise between local draft boards and recruiters seeking volunteers for the various services. Volunteering for Army service was ended after December 15, 1917. The problem persisted with regard to the Navy and the Marines, neither of which received any draftees. The conscriptionists feared that men would seek to volunteer for the relatively safe duty aboard ship to avoid the greater perceived danger in the trenches. In the end, volunteering for any of the services was ended, though the Navy and Marines accepted volunteers until August, 1918.<sup>110</sup>

The next part of Section 4 dealt with those who had a religious objection to participation in the war. The question of religious objectors and their treatment by the government and by society in World War I is beyond the scope of this thesis, but a few salient points should be mentioned. While an exemption from the compulsion of conscription was granted by the Army Bill, it was narrowly drawn, and was to cause significant difficulty. It was not an exemption based upon an individual's conscientious objection to participation in fighting. Rather, the statute stated that there were certain "well-recognized" religious groups that had existing tenets that objected to participation in fighting by its adherents. The Society of Friends comes to mind. Members of such groups would not be compelled to serve in combat roles. Even as to those individuals, though, the exemption was only sufficient to avoid combat. The president could still compel such individuals to perform non-combatant service. Some refused even that sort of duty. The problems presented by the exemption did not end there. A newly established religious group, known as Jehovah's Witnesses, objected to having its adherents participate in military service. Because it was not a "well-recognized" religion, its members initially faced prosecution or induction despite the group's beliefs. Further, the

doctrinal objection needed to support a claim of exemption had to be to combat in general; objection to United States participation in World War I, in particular, did not provide a basis for exemption. A qualifying belief had to be an objection to all combat, by any nation at any time. Roughly twenty thousand men asserted religious or conscientious objection to combat service in World War I; 90 per cent of even that small number of men were persuaded or coerced by harsh treatment by the Army to withdraw the claim. On the scale of a four-million-man military effort, the issue was a tiny distraction. The way in which those men were treated, though, is a dark chapter in American history.<sup>111</sup>

The largest class of men exempted, actually only deferred, were those men who would, if called to service, leave unsupported dependents behind. Because the war ended before the nation ran out of men held for service in 1917, deferment in 1917 amounted to exemption for the duration of the war. Until detailed regulations were issued at the end of 1917, local boards were left to make their own judgments of what the dependency language meant.

The Army Bill itself did not create additional classes of men who were exempt from the draft; however it gave the president the authority to create classes of men who were either exempt or subject to only “partial” service. First, the president could, and by regulation did, exempt government officials and employees below the state level. Next, the section gave the president the power to create a set of occupational exemptions for workers whose civilian employment made their withholding from the draft essential. The president did create an exemption from the draft for all those involved in ship-building and the merchant marine, occupations essential to the mammoth task of transporting men

and supplies to Europe. Limited occupational exemptions (2.89% of registrants) were given to men in certain positions in some industries. Wilson was pressured to create a general agriculture exemption but he did not do so. Instead, a few limited exemptions (1.89% of registrants) were given later in the war.<sup>112</sup>

Section 4 then turned to those local boards, the heart of the actual selection in the Selective Service System. District boards had existed under the Union Civil War draft, but they were very different from the World War I boards. The “district” for the board in the Civil War was a congressional district, a subdivision created for federal needs, not those of state or local government. Further, a congressional district usually covers many square miles and was hardly very local. Further, each district board was an overtly federal military operation. Uniformed Union Army soldiers went door-to-door registering prospective draftees in each district. A board headed by a uniformed military provost marshal, who commanded those soldiers, decided who among those registered would be drafted. The Civil War provost marshal was not necessarily a native of or even familiar with the area. If the draftee could not pay a substitute or buy his way out of service with cash, and did not report for induction, more uniformed soldiers would return to the door to force the draftee into the army.<sup>113</sup>

The Army Bill of 1917 enacted a system that put civilians in charge of who among their “friends and neighbors” would go to war. The statute created a system of local boards whose jurisdictions (called “Divisions”) would each include roughly thirty thousand people. The actual area to be chosen was to be a county or other state-created subdivision. In all, nearly forty-seven hundred boards were created. The section gave the president the power to appoint the boards from among the “local authorities” or other

residents of the area that the board was to serve. In fact, the eventual presidential appointees were largely those individuals nominated by the governors and local political leaders. Further, the section specifically forbade the appointment to the board of anyone connected to the military. This appointment system virtually guaranteed that the local board was an accurate representation of the local civilian power structure. Although the Army Bill permitted boards of three or more members, all of the boards in fact consisted of three men. No women were among the 14,416 people who served on boards. Of the nearly two hundred thousand people who operated the World War I Selective Service System, only about five thousand were military personnel. At the start, members of boards served as volunteers. Soon, it became clear that not everyone could afford such sacrifice. Further, the clerical support and other costs of the system had to be met. By the end of 1917, the national average cost per man held for service was just under \$5.00, roughly \$100 in 2012 dollars.<sup>114</sup>

The Army Bill created a class of individuals-males, between twenty-one and thirty years old, who were either citizens or declarants-every member of which was liable for service. Therefore, the task of the local board was to decide if a particular individual was to be exempted. The technical name of a board was not “Draft Board” but “Exemption Board.” Within its division, the local board was given broad power to make the exemption determination. Those determinations were to be made under rules and regulations that the President would promulgate. The president delegated the running of the system to Provost Marshal General Crowder, who had played a major role in writing the Army Bill.<sup>115</sup>

In addition to the local division boards, the Army Bill created district boards. Each district was a pre-existing federal judicial district, which was sometimes, but not always, co-extensive with the state. In all, one hundred and fifty-five district boards were created. The district boards, rather than the local division boards, were given the power to grant to a man any occupational exemption that the President might create. The district boards primarily acted as appellate tribunals to hear appeals from decisions made by the local boards. An individual held for service could appeal and the government could dispute an exemption. An appeal from a district board to the President was possible, but none actually got that far.<sup>116</sup>

Finally, Section 4 gave the president broad power to make rules and regulations over the actual workings of both the local and district boards. For most of 1917, those rules were very vague, governing mainly forms and procedure; boards were left largely on their own to define the critical question of dependency. The first draft call for six hundred eighty-seven thousand men was fulfilled under that system. At the end of 1917, a complete reorganization of the draft classification system was announced. That reorganization sharply limited local board discretion. The local decisions examined were made under the former system in 1917, when local board discretion was more extensive.<sup>117</sup>

Section 5 dealt with the most urgent challenge for the draft system-getting prospective draftees registered. What was adopted was an additional example of the World War I draft system using pre-existing civilian processes to accomplish efficiently its huge tasks and to give the operation a civilian face while doing so. The labor-intensive and much-resented registration process from the Civil War was obviously unacceptable.

Planning for the task of registering an estimated ten million men began even before Wilson went to Congress for the Declaration of War. However, when the Army Bill was submitted to Congress, the administration had made no decision on how to accomplish the registration. Section 5's language therefore created an obligation to register in the class subject to the draft. The section then went on to say that the registration would be in a manner that the president would specify in the proclamation that he was to make following adoption of the Army Bill. General Crowder's recollection was that a member of Congress made the suggestion that led to the process that was used—the use of pre-existing civilian voting precincts. As early as April 23, 1917, while the Army Bill was still being hotly debated, the Provost Marshal General's Office confidentially contacted the state and territorial governors to inform them of the planned process and to begin distribution of the great masses of paperwork that would be needed. By Registration Day, June 5, 1917, forty-five million forms had been printed and distributed.<sup>118</sup>

The use of the pre-existing voting precincts and other election machinery had many advantages. By using the usual civilian voting places, no directions to registration sites needed to be created and distributed. The regulations adopted gave to the governors the power to appoint the three-man registration boards, which supervised the volunteers doing the actual registrations. As was suggested by Baker, the appointments went mainly to the same familiar local individuals who operated the civil election process. They had local knowledge of who should appear, including which men were already in the military and thus not available to register.<sup>119</sup>

Finally, Section 5 included additional language that expressed another lesson learned from adverse Civil War experience and that highlighted the draft as a “civilian”

operation. In the Civil War, offenses against the draft law were prosecuted by court martial. In World War I, most offenses were prosecuted, albeit harshly in many cases, in civilian courts; failing to register being a mere misdemeanor punishable by a year in jail.<sup>120</sup>

Section 6 gave the president the power to use every organ of federal, state or territorial government to carry out the law. The constitutionality of extending presidential power beyond the federal government was unsuccessfully challenged in court. Section 6 provided a basis to prosecute those who counseled resistance to the draft. That resistance and its ruthless suppression are interesting topics, having given rise to civil liberties organizations including the American Civil Liberties Union, but are beyond the scope of this thesis. The exception to civilian prosecution was that, since every man in the draft class was considered to be in the army unless exempted, failure to appear was considered to be desertion, a military offense punishable by court martial.<sup>121</sup>

Section 10 of the Army Bill guaranteed equality of pay and other benefits between Regular Army soldiers and those enlisted for the duration of the war, whether former members of the National Guard, volunteers or draftees. The section also gave enlisted men significant pay increases. From a pre-war range of \$24 to roughly \$50 per month, pay was increased to \$36 to roughly \$56 per month. Congress later greatly expanded the War Risk Insurance Act (WRIA,) originally passed in 1914 to protect the American merchant marine. Under the amended WRIA, domestic allotments were paid directly to soldiers' families, which added an additional \$15 to \$50 more to the soldier's monthly compensation package, meaning total cash payments ranged from roughly \$50 to over \$100 per month. In 1917, even a skilled factory worker would be fortunate to earn

that much. In 2012 dollars, the range of compensation for enlisted men translates to about \$900 to about \$1,800 per month, or \$10,000 to \$20,000 per year. The WRIA represented the first time direct federal support payments were made to individuals; it would serve as a model for later social welfare programs. The draft bill and the other actions taken during World War I provided patterns of governmental power that would reappear in the New Deal, the growth of social welfare programs, and other expansions of governmental power in the twentieth century and beyond.<sup>122</sup>

Section 12 and Section 13 are two long sections that have related purposes; they were intended to protect the morals of young men, perceived to be threatened by the evils of the military life: alcohol and prostitutes. The fear of those perceived threats was among the concerns that had fueled opposition to United States entry into the war. Those fears were particular strong among rural populations who often viewed the cities, and their largely immigrant inhabitants, as more susceptible to what the rural dwellers viewed as vice.

First, Section 12 authorized the President to make regulations governing the sale of alcohol “in or near” military establishments. At the minimum, it was a crime or military offense to sell, supply or possess alcohol at a military establishment itself, except for permitted medicinal purposes. Further, the “in or near” language gave the president power beyond the military establishment itself. Violation within the military establishment or by a soldier anywhere was an offense under the Articles of War, subject to a court martial. For a civilian acting outside the military area, the violation was made a misdemeanor, punishable in the civilian courts by up to a thousand dollar fine, a year in jail or both. This dual venue for prosecution struck a balance between extending military

jurisdiction beyond the military establishment itself for soldiers, while preserving civilian jurisprudence for those not in the military, if they acted on civil ground. The section was a presaging of national prohibition which became the Eighteenth Amendment, approved by Congress only seven months after the passage of the Army Bill.<sup>123</sup>

Section 13 similarly dealt with the perceived danger presented to soldiers' morals by "houses of ill fame, brothels or bawdy houses" near military establishments. There were interesting differences between the two sections. In Section 13, it was the Secretary of War who was given power to deal with prostitution, and it was very broad power indeed. He could do anything that he deemed necessary on the issue, at whatever distance from a military establishment he deemed necessary to suppress prostitution. The Secretary could act against prostitution anywhere under the jurisdiction of the United States, imposing whatever regulation he deemed necessary. Although violation of such regulations by civilians other than at the military establishment remained a civil offense, this grant of virtual nationwide martial law regarding prostitution was extraordinary.<sup>124</sup>

Finally, Section 14 was a conflicts-of-laws clause, making the Army Bill the controlling law over every other federal law, and, because of the Supremacy Clause of the U. S. Constitution, over every state law, as well.<sup>125</sup>

Although the Army Bill dictated many important aspects of the draft, it remained for Crowder and the team under his command to create a system that could actually work. One of the great challenges would be to insulate draft selection decisions from the anti-immigrant sentiment that was evidenced by the restrictionist legislation that Congress had passed only three months before the Army Bill.<sup>126</sup>

## Chapter 4. Friends and Neighbors

(T)he administration of the draft (was put) into the hands of the friends and neighbors of the men to be affected.

Provost Marshall General Enoch H. Crowder (1920)<sup>127</sup>

In the winter and spring of 1917, the United States Congress took two seemingly unrelated actions. In February, the Congress passed one of a series of laws that would culminate within a few years in the most restrictive immigration law in the history of the United States. That series of enactments codified an animosity toward immigrants heightened by “scientific racism.” That then-popular theory argued that certain groups of people, like the original Anglo-Saxon settlers of the United States, were genetically superior in many ways, including being better suited for democratic government. Conversely, other people, including the wave of Southern and Eastern European immigrants arriving in huge numbers at the time, were inferior, and always would be. In May, responding to the need to create a mass army to join the fighting in World War I, the Congress passed a military draft, turning back supporters of the traditional volunteer force. Did the motivation that led to the important step on the road to highly restrictionist immigration legislation affect the decisions made by local draft boards of who was sent to fight?<sup>128</sup>

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<sup>127</sup>Notes to Chapter 4

Crowder, *The Spirit of Selective Service*, 120.

<sup>128</sup> Higham, *Strangers in the Land*, 271.

There is no known archive of individual case-files created by the boards. However, the search for bias against immigrants and their sons on the part of the draft can be made using an approach found in modern claims of discrimination: analysis of the statistics of outcome to infer the motivations of decision-makers. The basic assumption of this approach is that an unexplained pattern of adverse and disparate outcomes with regard to a particular group implies discriminatory intent on the part of decision-makers. This essentially statistical approach involves two basic questions: (1) What decisions did the boards make? and (2) Did those decisions reflect the compositions of the population subject to the draft within the board's division? With each of the six boards serving a unique division, six separate analyses are made. A composite of the six boards is then analyzed.<sup>129</sup>

Prior to consideration of any claim for exemption, each man was physically examined. A man found to be physically unfit was exempted immediately. In 1917, the boards studied found 1,754 men to be physically unfit, 30 percent of the total called for examination. However, with no case-files it is not possible to know which men were exempted as unfit and which men were exempted because of dependents or for some other reason.<sup>130</sup>

It is safe to assume that they wanted to be exempted. Even in the period of greatest war-fever just after the Declaration of War, there was no great wave of volunteers. Only two to three thousand men a day in the entire country were enlisting. Part of the reason the Wilson administration decided upon a draft was that it was extremely unlikely that there would be enough volunteers for an army. The war had

been closely covered by American newspapers so the nature of trench warfare was no mystery to prospective recruits. Not many men would choose to leave the relative safety of civilian life for the dangers of the trenches. Further, family men would have that additional impediment to going to war willingly. By the time the first draft selection decisions were being made in the summer of 1917, anyone who wanted to volunteer could have done so. More men were exempted than were held for service. In 1917, the six boards studied exempted 2,842 men and held 1,448 men for service. In fact, by the middle of 1918, the pool of men selected for service was running low, necessitating expansions of the pool of eligible men.<sup>131</sup>

Conversely, some men did want to serve, likely because they wanted to demonstrate their claim to be “Americans.” Aliens are excluded from the analysis, because they were legally entitled to exemption. Therefore, the fact that a board exempted an alien reveals nothing about the board’s decision-making. However, that an alien was held for service almost certainly means that the man did not assert his claim to an exemption, since the boards counseled men on their rights. In identifying the six hundred men in the samples of men held for service, forty-five aliens were identified and excluded from the sample.

The first useful source of information in answering those questions is the records of the Selective Service System (SSS), as the draft system was formally called. At the end of World War I, the records of the local boards were transferred to the Office of the Provost Marshall General (OPMG) in the War Department. After the records had passed through several bureaucratic sections within that Department, they became the

responsibility of the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA.) The SSS records for various local and district boards were distributed among the sixteen regional NARA Records Centers. The records for the Massachusetts local boards were located at the NARA's Federal Records Center in Waltham, Massachusetts in 2010 and 2011. Since that time, all of the draft-related records formerly at the regional centers have been consolidated at the NARA's National Military Records Center in St. Louis, Missouri.<sup>132</sup>

The most relevant records are the so-called docket books. Each docket book consisted of a bound collection of large individual sheets of paper, each of which bore a standard form issued by the OPMG and used by the local board in 1917 to record its decisions, man-by-man, regarding who was exempted and who was held for service. Each sheet was about twenty inches by fourteen inches, laid out in landscape format. The sheets contained two dozen columns that provided space to record everything about SSS action regarding the man from the order in which his case was considered by the local board to the date on which an appeal of a board's decision was acted upon by the President. (No appeal actually reached the President.)

The next useful set of SSS records are the registration cards. On June 5, 1917, nearly ten million men registered for the draft. The cards recording those registrations gathered several items of information about the man, including name, age, birthplace, marital status, employment, and residence at the time of registration. Each man was assigned a numerical designation, a so-called "red-ink number," which appeared both on his registration card and next to his name in the docket book. For a particular board, the red-ink numbers ran from one to the highest number need to designate separately each

individual. A national lottery established a random, nation-wide sequence in which men were considered by the local boards, based upon the red-ink numbers.<sup>133</sup>

Armed with the information on the registration cards, it is possible to locate individual men on the third set of individual records: returns of the census enumerators in either the 1910 United States census, the 1920 United States census, or on the returns from both censuses. In addition to much other information, the individual census returns provided the man's birthplace and those of his parents. In addition, the enumerator returns showed naturalization dates, where applicable, and familial situation, which was highly relevant to a board's decision on the critical question of the existence of dependents who might provide the man with an exemption.<sup>134</sup>

Using these sources of information on identifiable individuals, two samples were created for each board: (1) the first one hundred men exempted from service, and (2) the first one hundred men held for induction upon the call of the Army for men. These samples represent the decisions of the boards. The principal difficulty in tracking specific individuals across the various data sources was the varying handwriting of those who created the records, including census enumerators, draft board clerks and the men themselves.

With information regarding what local boards decided man-by-man, and with additional census information about those individuals, the inquiry turns to information on the communities from which those men were drawn. The 1910 and 1920 censuses reported information regarding the communities within a particular board's division. Of course, the draft was not conducted in either 1910 or 1920 so one must view the two

census data-sets as useful, but not precise, approximations of the communities in 1917. The country added an estimated 5.7 million people (6.2%) between 1910 and the start of the European war in 1914. The war itself curtailed immigration between 1914 and 1917, reducing the yearly average of new arrivals from more than a million people per year to just over three hundred thousand. Also during those years four hundred thousand emigrant aliens left the United States, producing a net total immigration of just over five hundred thousand in the years 1914-1916. Therefore, the estimated change in population between the 1910 census and 1917 of about ten million was composed mainly of growth in the already-resident population. Therefore, the data from the 1910 census was a close approximation of the situation in 1917 with regard to aliens in the United States. Further, while both censuses reported community data on the birthplaces of the population, the 1910 census provided more detailed information on smaller municipalities than did the 1920 census. Therefore, the 1910 census is used as the basis for analysis of the composition of the boards' respective divisions.<sup>135</sup>

In both the 1910 and the 1920 censuses, the population was first divided into categories based upon race, as that word is used in the early twenty-first century. Since the non-white population of Massachusetts in 1910 was only 1.2 percent, analysis of the draft experience of non-white men would not be statistically reliable on the basis of only six draft boards. Therefore, only the white population will be addressed. For all but the smallest municipalities, the censuses reported divisions of the white population into classifications, based upon the birthplace of the individual and in some cases upon the birthplaces of the individual's parents. The census classifications were "Native white-Native parentage," "Native white-Foreign or mixed parentage," and "Foreign-born

white.” These classifications will be referred to as “native,” “second generation,” and “first generation,” respectively.

In examining the draft, an adjustment must be made to the figures for the first generation, since only citizens and declarants could be drafted. The census data reported the number of first generation men who had naturalized or declared their intention to do so. Therefore, it is possible to adjust the community’s distribution of the census classifications to reflect more accurately the pool of men from which the particular draft board could draw. These classifications provide a direct enumeration of the composition of the pool of men from which a board drew potential soldiers. By examining the individual data from the draft records and from the census enumerators’ returns, it is possible to determine which census classification each man was in. By comparing the distribution of census classifications of the samples of a board’s decision-making with the adjusted distribution of census classifications within the board’s division, it is possible to examine whether the draft selection displayed bias against the first generation immigrants and their second generation sons. In almost every case, there are variations among the percentages of distribution of census classifications. With the available samples, individual circumstances of only a few men can affect the percentages significantly. It is not mere variation, but a pattern of such variations that would demonstrate discriminatory intent.

First, comparisons are made between the distribution of census classifications of the division that the board served and the samples of those exempted and those held for service. If the adjusted census classification distributions of the division are roughly equal to those of the samples, there is no evidence of discrimination based on census

classification. If there is a marked over-representation of the draft-eligible first or second generation in those held for service or, conversely, an over-representation of the native men in those exempted from service, one can infer bias against immigrants and their sons. For each division, a table shows the census classification distribution for the adjusted population of the division, for the exempted sample, and for the held-for-service sample. In general, the number of non-white persons is so small that it is represented as zero.

Second, a similar comparison is made to determine how the board handled the critical issue of dependency. A man was considered to have a dependent if one or more family members would be left unsupported by his induction into the army. The draft boards dealt with three dependency statuses: married men (with or without children); single man who claimed no dependents; and single men who claimed that other family members were dependent upon them. Were men in the same dependency status treated equally, unaffected by the man's census classification? If so, anti-immigrant bias was not present. If on the other hand, the distribution of exemptions differs from the distribution of census classifications, evidence of bias would be present. For simplicity sake, the analysis looks only at those men who were exempted. For each division, a table shows the number of men in each category within the two-hundred-man total sample for the board. The next table shows the percentage of men in each census classification and in each dependency status who were exempted.

Without individual case-files, all that can be said is that a particular man was exempted, not why he was exempted. There were reasons other than dependency for exemption, especially physical unfitness. However, there is no evidence that those other

reasons were related to census classifications. Further, the existence of a spouse or other person claimed to be dependent upon the potential draftee did not necessarily earn an exemption. For example, the family of a wealthy draftee would not be left unsupported by his induction. Moreover, for some men, the pay in the army, especially when combined with the domestic allotment under the War Risk Insurance Act actually exceeded their pre-war pay. Therefore, induction would not worsen the household's financial situation, especially with no need to feed, clothe, or house the draftee from the household budget. Finally, one must keep in mind that some of the sample sizes in the subcategories of dependency status are quite small-even zero. Therefore, the validity of the comparative approach cannot be pressed too far.

An analysis of the decisions made by all of the more than four thousand local draft boards would be a gargantuan task. There is also the issue of record survival and accessibility. Prior to the transfer of the draft records to a central location, each NARA Center had records of a specific region. That limited the effective selection to the New England records stored in Waltham, Massachusetts. Further, the distribution of census classifications and of attitudes toward immigrants varied across the country. Massachusetts had a high percentage of first generation immigrants and their second generation children. It was also the home of Harvard College, where the Teutonism and the "scientific racism" of the early twentieth century was very strong. Finally, Massachusetts was home to the most prominent legislative advocate for immigration restriction, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge. With many immigrants and their children and strong anti-immigrant feeling among prominent people in the Commonwealth, if there

was anti-immigrant bias, presumably it would likely have been manifested in Massachusetts. For these reasons, Massachusetts was selected for examination.<sup>136</sup>

Massachusetts had one hundred twenty-four local boards, necessitating the selection of a limited number of boards for analysis. Also, Massachusetts was a diverse place; it contained pockets of great wealth, industrial zones, affluent suburbs, rural farming areas, and vibrant mill-towns. A selection to represent that diversity was made. Selected for examination were local boards serving six Massachusetts divisions: Beverly, Brookline, East Brookfield, Lawrence No. 1, Lawrence No. 2, and Lawrence No. 3.

The Beverly Division consisted of the City of Beverly, and the Towns of Hamilton, Manchester and Wenham. Beverly contained 77 percent of the total population of the division. All of the men selected for the samples and the census classification data used for comparison purposes are drawn exclusively from Beverly. In 1917 Beverly was a small, but diverse city. Beverly had many factories, including the United Shoe Machinery Corporation, one of the largest factories in the world. In addition, part of the extremely wealthy “Gold Coast” ran along the Beverly shore, providing both residences to some of the richest families in the nation and employment to a large number of builders, domestic workers, and groundskeepers. In 1910, Beverly’s population, once the adjustment is made for the members of the first generation who had not begun or completed the naturalization process, had been 16,088, and was classified as 57 percent native, 30 percent second generation, and 13 percent first generation.<sup>137</sup>

Table 1 below shows the comparison of the census classification of Beverly as a whole with that of the one-hundred-man sample of those exempted and the one-hundred-man sample of those held for service.

Beverly Division (Beverly only)	Population	Adjusted Distribution of Population	Distribution of Exempted Sample	Distribution of Held Sample
Total Population 1910	18,650			
Total First Generation	4,661			
Estimated Aliens	2,562			
Adjusted Population	16,088			
ADJUSTED CENSUS CLASSIFICATIONS				
Native	9,124	57%	61%	52%
Second Generation	4,795	30%	28%	27%
Estimated Naturalized or Declarant First Generation	2,099	13%	11%	21%
Negro	51	0%	0%	0%
Asian	19	0%	0%	0%

Table 1  
Distribution of Exempted and Held for Service Samples  
in Beverly

Author's computations from Exemption Board and Census records. See text for source citations.

The next comparison looks to the handling of the question of dependency by the Beverly Board for the entire two-hundred-man sample. The interpretation of this comparison must be made with caution as some of the cells have very few men in them, as shown on Table 2.

Number of Men in Cell	Married	Single, other dependents	Single
Total Sample	67	17	116
First Generation	6	4	22
Second Generation	20	5	30
Native	41	8	64

Table 2  
Cell Populations for Dependency Analysis in Beverly

Author's computations from Exemption Board and Census records. See text for source citations.

Table 3 shows the distribution by census classification of dependency statuses in the Beverly sample of those exempted. For example, 72 percent of the married native men in the total sample of two hundred men were exempted; while 67 percent of the married first generation men were exempted.

Percent Exempted	Married	Single, other dependents	Single
Total Sample	72%	47%	38%
First Generation	67%	25%	27%
Second Generation	70%	80%	40%
Native	76%	50%	40%

Table 3  
 Dependency Exemptions in Beverly  
 Author's computations from Exemption Board and Census records. See text for source citations.

The Brookline Division served only the Town of Brookline, an affluent street-car suburb of Boston, with commercial activity and some light industry. In 1910, the adjusted population of Brookline was 24,555 people. Of the Town's adjusted population, 47 percent were native, 31 percent were second generation, and 21 percent were first generation.<sup>138</sup>

Table 4 below shows the comparison of the census classification of Brookline as a whole with that of the sample of those exempted and the sample of those held for service.

<sup>138</sup> U. S. Bureau of the Census, *1910 Census: I*, 860, 880.

Brookline Division	Population	Adjusted Distribution of Population	Distribution of Exempted Sample	Distribution of Held Sample
Total Population 1910	27,792			
Total First Generation	8,345			
Estimated Aliens	3,237			
Adjusted Population	24,555			
ADJUSTED CENSUS CLASSIFICATIONS				
Native	11,615	47%	42%	43%
Second Generation	7,587	31%	45%	38%
Estimated Naturalized or Declarant First Generation	5,108	21%	13%	18%
Negro	221	1%	0%	0%
Asian	24	0%	0%	0%

Table 4  
Distribution of Exempted and Held for Service Samples  
in Brookline

Author's computations from Exemption Board and Census records. See text for source citations.

The small number of men in some of the cells for the examination of how dependency was handled in Brookline as shown on Table 5 and Table 6 requires caution in the interpretation of the distribution of exemption relative to dependency status.

Number of Men in Cell	Married	Single, other dependents	Single
Total Sample	68	16	116
First Generation	13	1	17
Second Generation	25	7	51
Native	30	8	48

Table 5  
Cell Populations for Dependency Analysis in Brookline

Author's computations from Exemption Board and Census records. See text for source citations.

The Brookline figures show that native men were actually less likely to be exempted in every category than men in the second generation, which is strong evidence that the Brookline Board did not discriminate against the sons of immigrants.

Percent Exempted	Married	Single, other dependents	Single
Total Sample	85%	56%	28%
First Generation	77%	0%	17%
Second Generation	96%	71%	31%
Native	80%	50%	29%

Table 6  
Dependency Exemptions in Brookline  
Author's computations from Exemption Board and Census records. See text for source citations.

Finding a division to represent rural Massachusetts is complicated by the fact that census classification data for towns of less than twenty-five hundred people was not reported in the 1910 census. The Exemption Board serving a rural area that seemed to have the most complete available data was the East Brookfield Exemption Board, whose division consisted of ten small communities south and west of Worcester in central Massachusetts: Auburn, Brookfield, Charlton, Leicester, Millbury, North Brookfield, Oxford, Paxton, Spencer, and West Brookfield. The 1910 population of those towns ranged from a mere 416 to 6,740, totaling 29,552. Census classification data for five of those towns, with a total population of 21,153 (72 %), was reported. The percentage of first and second generation individuals in those five reported towns varied from 49 percent to 68 percent, suggesting that there was variation in the census classifications within the unreported towns. Although the men within the samples of those exempted and those selected includes men from all of the towns in the division, only the reported census

data is used for comparison purposes. While this reduces the reliability of the data, no more reliable rural division was identified. The lack of data on the smallest towns also reduces the reliability of the estimate of the number of the first generation who had started or completed the process of naturalization. Using the data from the five reported towns, the best estimate is that the population of the division served by the East Brookfield Board was 46 percent native, 44 percent second generation, and 9 percent naturalized or declarant first generation.<sup>139</sup>

Table 7 below shows the comparison of the census classifications for the five reported towns in the East Brookfield Division with that of the sample of those exempted and the sample of those held for service.

East Brookfield Division	Population (Five Reported Towns)	Adjusted Distribution of Population	Distribution of Exempted Sample	Distribution of Held Sample
Total Population 1910	21,153			
Total First Generation	4,452			
Estimated Aliens	2,711			
Adjusted Population	18,442			
<b>ADJUSTED CENSUS CLASSIFICATIONS</b>				
Native	8,500	46%	40%	44%
Second Generation	8,152	44%	50%	54%
Estimated Naturalized or Declarant First Generation	1,741	9%	10%	2%
Negro	28	0%	0%	0%
Asian	12	0%	0%	0%

Table 7  
Distribution of Exempted and Held for Service Samples  
in East Brookfield Division

Author's computations from Exemption Board and Census records. See text for source citations.

<sup>139</sup> U. S. Bureau of the Census, *1910 Census: I*, 861, 887-889.

Table 8 below shows the numerical distribution of men in the two-hundred-man sample across the dependency statuses and the census classifications.

Number of Men in Cell	Married	Single, other dependents	Single
Total Sample	64	17	119
First Generation	7	1	4
Second Generation	28	7	65
Native	29	9	50

Table 8

Cell Populations for Dependency Analysis in East Brookfield Division

Author's computations from Exemption Board and Census records. See text for source citations.

Table 9 shows the outcome of the East Brookfield Board's exemption decisions by the dependency status and the census classification of the prospective draftees.

Percent Exempted	Married	Single, other dependents	Single
Total Sample	91%	35%	30%
First Generation	100%	100%	50%
Second Generation	89%	43%	28%
Native	90%	22%	32%

Table 9

Dependency Exemptions in East Brookfield Division

Author's computations from Exemption Board and Census records. See text for source citations.

Some municipalities were too big to be included in or to constitute a single local board division for the World War I draft. The large manufacturing city of Lawrence was divided into three divisions: Lawrence No. 1, Lawrence No. 2, and Lawrence No. 3. Lawrence was one of America's great river mill-towns, having been founded in 1845. Using first water power from the Merrimack River and later steam power, huge textile

factories were the principal employers in a city with a 1910 population of 85,892. The mills' workforce was drawn from an ethnically diverse city. The 1910 census lists individuals who had been born or who had parents who had been born in nearly two dozen countries. In 1910 the city as a whole was only 14 percent native, 38 percent second generation and 48 percent first generation. The adjustments to the distribution of the census classifications necessitated by the presence of many non-declarant aliens in the city are reflected in the tables that follow for the three Lawrence divisions.<sup>140</sup>

Significantly, in 1912 Lawrence had been the scene of very divisive labor unrest, the so-called Bread and Roses strike. Not only did the strike divide the largely native ownership and managerial class from the largely first and second generation workforce, the workforce itself was sharply divided along ethnic lines, with some ethnic groups, like the Italians, joining the strike and others, like the French Canadians, bitterly opposing the work disruptions. In general, the strike was spearheaded by first generation workers, who received only half-hearted support or active opposition from second generation and native workers. If ethnic animosity was alive anywhere in 1917, it was alive in Lawrence.<sup>141</sup>

The exemption board serving Lawrence Division Number 1 had jurisdiction over Wards 1 and 6 of that city. The population of those wards was largely immigrants and their children; only 22 percent of the population was native. Table 10 shows the distribution by census classification of the division's population, and of the two one-hundred-man samples of those exempted and those held for service. The total population and its distribution have been adjusted for the relatively large number of non-declarant aliens.



Lawrence Division 1 (Wards 1 and 6)	Population	Adjusted Distribution of Population	Distribution of Exempted Sample	Distribution of Held Sample
Total Population 1910	28,318			
Total First Generation	12,446			
Estimated Aliens	6,866			
Adjusted Population	2,1452			
ADJUSTED CENSUS CLASSIFICATIONS				
Native	4,685	22%	19%	21%
Second Generation	11,143	52%	54%	59%
Estimated Naturalized or Declarant First Generation	5,580	26%	27%	20%
Negro	30	0%	0%	0%
Asian	14	0%	0%	0%

Table 10

Distribution of Exempted and Held for Service Samples  
in Lawrence No.1 Division

Author's computations from Exemption Board and Census records. See text for source citations.

Table 11 shows the numerical distribution of men in the two-hundred-man sample for the Lawrence Number 1 Division across the dependency statuses and the census classifications. The division's small native population is evident.

Number of Men in Cell	Married	Single, other dependents	Single
Total Sample	80	33	87
First Generation	24	9	14
Second Generation	44	16	53
Native	12	8	20

Table 11

Cell Populations for Dependency Analysis in Lawrence No. 1 Division

Author's computations from Exemption Board and Census records. See text for source citations.

Table 12 shows the distribution of exemption decisions made by the Lawrence Number 1 Division by dependency status and census classification.

Percent Exempted	Married	Single, other dependents	Single
Total Sample	80%	33%	29%
First Generation	83%	11%	43%
Second Generation	72%	44%	25%
Native	83%	38%	30%

Table 12

Dependency Exemptions in Lawrence No. 1 Division

Author's computations from Exemption Board and Census records. See text for source citations.

Lawrence Number 2 Division was comprised of the City's Wards 2 and 3. The native population of the division was even smaller than that of Division 1. Table 13 shows the data for that division.

Lawrence Division 2 (Wards 2 and 3)	Population	Adjusted Distribution of Population	Distribution of Exempted Sample	Distribution of Held Sample
Total Population 1910	27,807			
Total First Generation	15,026			
Estimated Aliens	10,612			
Adjusted Population	17,195			
ADJUSTED CENSUS CLASSIFICATIONS				
Native	3,026	18%	16%	15%
Second Generation	9,705	56%	56%	58%
Estimated Naturalized or Declarant First Generation	4,414	26%	28%	27%
Negro	33	0%	0%	0%
Asian	17	0%	0%	0%

Table 13

Distribution of Exempted and Held for Service Samples  
in Lawrence No.2 Division

Author's computations from Exemption Board and Census records. See text for source citations.

Table 14 displays the number of men in the two-hundred-man sample for the Lawrence Number 2 Division, showing the distribution of dependency statuses and the census classifications.

Number of Men in Cell	Married	Single, other dependents	Single
Total Sample	59	30	111
First Generation	19	9	27
Second Generation	32	16	66
Native	8	5	18

Table 14

Cell Populations for Dependency Analysis in Lawrence No. 2 Division  
 Author's computations from Exemption Board and Census records. See text for source citations.

Table 15 shows the distribution of the men exempted by the Lawrence No. 2 Division Board by census classification and dependency status. For example, 81 percent of the married men in the two-hundred-man sample were exempted.

Percent Exempted	Married	Single, other dependents	Single
Total Sample	81%	50%	33%
First Generation	89%	33%	30%
Second Generation	78%	31%	35%
Native	75%	80%	33%

Table 15

Exempted Men by Dependency Status in Lawrence No. 2 Division  
 Author's computations from Exemption Board and Census records. See text for source citations.

Lawrence Number 3 Division covered Wards 4 and 5 of the City. As within the other Divisions within the City, the native portion of the population was the smallest of the census classifications. Table 16 compares the distribution of the adjusted population

by census classification with the distribution within the samples of men considered by the Lawrence No. 3 Exemption Board.

Lawrence Division 3 (Wards 4 and 5)	Population	Adjusted Distribution of Population	Distribution of Exempted Sample	Distribution of Held Sample
Total Population 1910	29,761			
Total First Generation	13,827			
Estimated Aliens	8,131			
Adjusted Population	21,630			
ADJUSTED CENSUS CLASSIFICATIONS				
Native	3,988	18%	16%	22%
Second Generation	11,725	54%	66%	60%
Estimated Naturalized or Declarant First Generation	5,696	26%	18%	18%
Negro	196	1%	0%	0%
Asian	25	0%	0%	0%

Table 16

Distribution of Exempted and Held for Service Samples  
in Lawrence No. 3 Division

Author's computations from Exemption Board and Census records. See text for source citations.

Table 17 shows the number of men within the two-hundred-man sample, divided by dependency status and census classification.

Number of Men in Cell	Married	Single, other dependents	Single
Total Sample	81	27	92
First Generation	20	2	14
Second Generation	44	20	62
Native	17	5	16

Table 17

Cell Populations for Dependency Analysis in Lawrence No. 3 Division

Author's computations from Exemption Board and Census records. See text for source citations.

Table 18 analyses the men who were exempted by the Lawrence Number 3 Division Board, listing them by census classification and dependency status.

Percent Exempted	Married	Single, other dependents	Single
Total Sample	79%	41%	27%
First Generation	75%	0%	21%
Second Generation	87%	35%	29%
Native	59%	40%	25%

Table 18

Exempted Men by Dependency Status in Lawrence No. 3 Division

Author's computations from Exemption Board and Census records. See text for source citations.

The distribution among census classifications of the samples of the six individual boards show only minor differences from the populations of the corresponding divisions. However, the small number of men in some of the cells makes a conclusion regarding any pattern suspect. Therefore, the analysis that follows is based upon a composite of all six boards to see if those minor variations themselves show a pattern.

Table 19 shows the adjusted distribution of census classifications in the total population of the six draft divisions. The lack of detailed census classification for the five smallest communities in the East Brookfield Division affects the total population and the distribution of census classifications on this table, but does not affect the distribution across the census classifications for the combined samples of either exempted men or men held for service.

Six Board Composite	Population	Adjusted Distribution of Population	Distribution of Exempted Sample	Distribution of Held Sample
Total Population 1910	153,481			
Total First Generation	58,757			
Estimated Aliens	34,119			
Adjusted Population	119,362			
ADJUSTED CENSUS CLASSIFICATIONS				
Native	40,938	34%	32%	33%
Second Generation	53,107	44%	50%	49%
Estimated Naturalized or Declarant First Generation	24,638	21%	18%	18%
Negro	559	0%	0%	0%
Asian	111	0%	0%	0%

Table 19  
Distribution of Exempted and Held for Service Samples  
for Composite

Author's computations from Exemption Board and Census records. See text for source citations.

With regard to dependency, Table 20 shows the number of men in the composite twelve-hundred-man sample by census classification and dependency status. While the numbers within the specific cells are obviously larger within the composite sample, some cells remain relatively small.

Number of Men in Cell	Married	Single, other dependents	Single
Total Sample	419	140	641
First Generation	89	26	98
Second Generation	193	71	327
Native	137	43	216

Table 20  
Cell Populations for Dependency Analysis for Composite

Author's computations from Exemption Board and Census records. See text for source citations.

Finally, Table 21 shows the analysis of the exempted men by their census classifications and dependency statuses.

Percent Exempted	Married	Single, other dependents	Single
Total Sample	81%	43%	31%
First Generation	82%	23%	29%
Second Generation	83%	49%	31%
Native	78%	44%	33%

Table 21  
Dependency Exemptions for Composite  
Author's computations from Exemption Board and Census records. See text for source citations

Having examined twelve hundred separate decisions made by six separate boards and established the composition by census classifications of the six divisions served by those boards, a conclusion can be reached on the central question. This data shows no evidence of discrimination against immigrants or their sons in who was sent to war or who was exempted. The census classification distributions of those drafted and those exempted closely track the census classifications of the populations from which those boards drew their men. The logic of the statistical method employed leads to the conclusion that the census classifications of the men under consideration played no discernible role in the decisions made by the boards. This, of course, should have been true, if the boards were following the law. On the basis of this data, one must conclude that these boards at least did not pursue local agenda, as Jennifer Keene concluded. Nor did they target the relatively powerless, as David Kennedy thought. Finally, they did not serve the interests of local elites, as Jeanette Keith claimed. Rather, they made selections among the men under consideration that accurately reflected the populations of the divisions served.<sup>142</sup>

The first argument in support of the validity of that conclusion comes from the selection method for the samples analyzed. The sequence for the consideration of men by the boards was set by a random national lottery based upon numbers that had been assigned immediately after registrations on June 5, 1917. The samples of the first one hundred identifiable men exempted and the first one hundred men held for service by each board were extracted from that random sequence, making the samples themselves a random selection of those registering.

Next the mode of selection of the members of the draft boards insures that they were a reasonable representation of the power structure of the area served. Under the statute, board members had to be resident in and familiar with the division that the board served. They were appointed by the governor from among prominent local leaders, nominated locally. They were thus the existing local power structures, specifically embodied.

Next, the selected boards served divisions that reflected the economic and demographic diversity of Massachusetts. Some divisions had few first-and-second-generation men. Another had few native men. Some boards served an urban mill town. Another was a street-car suburb. Another was a collection of small towns. The final division was a combination of heavy industry and affluent residences.

The strongest argument for the validity of the conclusion is the data itself. Whether looked at in terms of distribution of census classifications in the exempted samples or in the held for service samples, the only pattern that emerges is a lack of any pattern. Looking at the individual boards, men in the first generation were over-represented in those held for service in two cases, under-represented in four cases. Men

of the second generation were over-represented in those held for service in five cases, under-represented in one case. Native men were over-represented in those held for service in only one case and under-represented in five cases. There are few exact matches of census classifications between the samples and the respective divisions from which they were drawn. This is not a surprise, of course, because the individual circumstances of a few men could move the distributions a few percentages points in one direction or another.

The separate analysis of outcomes regarding dependency for men of different census classifications similarly shows no pattern of bias against or of favoritism of a particular census classification. Examining the exemptions by dependency status for the individual boards shows that married men in the first generation were less likely to be exempted than the respective full two-hundred person samples in four cases; and more likely to be exempted in two cases. Married second generation men were more likely to be exempted in three cases, and less likely in three cases. Native married men were also more likely to be exempted in three cases and less likely in three cases. Single first generation men were more likely to be exempted in only one case. Second generation single men were more likely to be exempted than the total single men in the respective full two-hundred man samples in four cases. Native single men were more likely to be exempted in only one case. Finally, for men claiming dependents other than wives or children, first generation men were more likely to be exempted in only one case; second generation men in four cases; and native men in three cases.

The lack of individual case-files does hamper the analysis of exemption as it related to the existence or potential claim of a dependent, because we cannot know

whether a man who had an apparent dependent was actually supporting that person. Nor can we know a particular household's civilian income level compared with Army pay. It should be noted, though, that Massachusetts was prosperous in 1917, gaining much from war-time demands both for food and industrial goods.

Finally, the utility of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts as the site for the search for bias against immigrant men and their sons is buttressed by the relatively large number of such individuals in the state. Further, the "scientific racism" behind the restrictionist immigration movement of the time came from Massachusetts and the legislative campaign for restriction was led by a very prominent leader, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge. That combination makes the state a good place to search for discrimination.

An anomaly that does appear is the relative over-representation of second generation men in many of the samples, both of those exempted and of those held for service. In fact, second generation men are over-represented in general in the total twelve-hundred-man sample. This suggests that they were over-represented in those who registered for the draft. The first possible explanation is that the second generation population had risen between the 1910 figures used for comparison and the 1917 draft. The 1920 United States census shows that the percentage of second generation people in the Commonwealth had increased from 35 percent to 39 percent, while the percentage of those in the first generation had fallen from 32 percent to 28 percent. That seems consistent with the reduction in new immigration that the war itself created. It is also possible that the under-representation of first generation men in those registering for the draft was the result of a lack of understanding of the obligation to register.<sup>143</sup>

It is possible that the six Massachusetts boards or Massachusetts as a whole were aberrations. It is possible that a similar examination of other boards in Massachusetts or in other states would show discrimination. The best test of the validity of the conclusion that there was no bias against immigrants and their sons in the decisions of who was exempted and who was held for service in the World War I army would be to apply the methodology used in this work to other drafts boards in Massachusetts or in other states. Since the census records and the registration cards are available for every locality, the issue is whether the docket books for a particular board can be located. A search for the docket books of other draft boards would have to be accomplished at the NARA Military Records Center in St. Louis.

Absent contrary evidence from some other set of samples, the conclusion stands: draft board action in World War I was not affected by discrimination against immigrants or their sons. The obvious question is why this is there no evidence of such discrimination. There are several explanations, which would require additional and different research to prove or disprove.

First, it is possible that the controversy regarding immigration was simply not playing-out at the local level. Generations of working and living side-by-side with people of diverse backgrounds may have erased any animosity toward immigrants. The anti-immigrant campaign, in other words, may have been an elite phenomenon among the politically active class that had no analogue at the local level. This possibility could be explored by researching local editorials, news articles, letters to the editor, and local enactments to find signs of the anti-immigrant campaign. It does seem improbable that the immigration debate went unnoticed at the local level. Two of the leading political

leaders in the restrictionist campaign served Massachusetts. To be sure, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge was not popularly elected, but there is no reason to assume that he did not enjoy wide-spread support. Further, his son-in-law Congressman Augustus P. Gardner, also a leading figure on immigration restriction, was popularly elected, representing a district that included one of the divisions studied, Beverly. This would also raise the deeper question of whether the anti-immigrant feeling was actually as strong as the restrictive legislation of the early-1920s would suggest.

Second, it is also possible that the members of local draft boards, though aware of anti-immigrant sentiment, did not share it. The eighteen men who served on the six boards studied provide too small a group to provide a meaningful picture of the social characteristics of board members in general, especially regarding their own census classifications. A larger sample of board members could likely be assembled by consulting local newspaper coverage of board appointments. That sample could then be compared with census classification data. Certainly, at least some second-generation men must have climbed the local power ladders enough to have served on boards or to have influenced who was selected to do so. Absent some archive of the attitudes of the draft board members, one can only speculate. The men who served on draft boards were not top-tier figures. It is not probable that they have been studied in the historiography. However, local archives or surviving descendants may have diaries, letters, or expressions of the viewpoints of board members on the role of immigrants.

Third, the war presented an unusual situation. It is possible that there was no discrimination because the urgent need for an army encouraged the board members to avoid needless side-issues like claims of discrimination. Normal attitudes may have been

suspended by the emergency of the war. The Know Nothings' concern with immigration had been trumped by the much larger dispute over the expansion of slavery. Anti-immigrant feeling may have similarly been a temporarily lower priority than producing an army. The board members may have believed that they had been given a task by the statute and wanted to accomplish that task without distraction from an irrelevancy like census classification.

Much of the history of the United States in the twentieth century was the story of a three-sided contest for control over daily life among private action, state government, and the federal government. In carrying out the World War I draft, the federal government obtained massive cooperation with a great extension of its power into everyday life from both state government and private individuals. The draft was gone within a few months of the end of the war. When, however, a new emergency arose with the Great Depression, the draft's pattern of federal government action, and massive cooperation with that action, was well-established.



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<sup>107</sup> *Providing for calling into military service certain classes of persons*, Pub. Res. 29, 65<sup>th</sup> Cong. *U. S. Statutes at Large* 40 (1918): 554.

<sup>108</sup> *Army Bill of 1917*, § 3: 78. *Union Draft Law*, § 13: 733.

<sup>109</sup> *Army Bill of 1917*, § 4: 78. *NDA of 1916*, § 15:176. "Wants No Draft of Civil Leaders," *NYT*, April 13, 1917.

<sup>110</sup> Crowder, *Spirit of Selective Service*, 159, 167.

<sup>111</sup> *Army Bill of 1917*, § 4: 78-79.

<sup>112</sup> PMG, *Final Report*, 20.

<sup>113</sup> Chambers, *To Raise an Army*, 52. Crowder, *Spirit of Selective Service*, 83. *Union Draft Law*, § 5: 732.

<sup>114</sup> PMG, *First Report*, 11, 30. Bureau of Labor Statistics, at [www.bls.gov/data/inflation\\_calculator.htm](http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm), accessed January 24, 2013. *Army Bill of 1917*, § 4: 79. PMG, *Final Report*, 274-276.

<sup>115</sup> Crowder, *Spirit of Selective Service*, 120. PMG, *First Report*, 11-13.

<sup>116</sup> *Army Bill of 1917*, § 4: 79-80. PMG, *Final Report*, 7.

<sup>117</sup> *Army Bill of 1917*, § 4: 80. PMG, *SS Regs*, 2<sup>nd</sup>.

<sup>118</sup> Crowder, *Spirit of Selective Service*, 115, 124, 124-125.

<sup>119</sup> Keith, *Rich Man's War, Poor Man's Fight*, 59.

<sup>120</sup> *Army Bill of 1917*, § 5: 80. *Union Draft Law*, § 7: 732.

<sup>121</sup> *Army Bill of 1917*, § 6: 80-81. *Arver v. United States*, 245 U. S. 366 (1918).

<sup>122</sup> *Army Bill of 1917*, § 10: 82. Chambers, *To Raise an Army*, 175, 185, 347. Bureau of Labor Statistics, at [www.bls.gov/data/inflation\\_calculator.htm](http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm), accessed January 24, 2013. War Risk Insurance effective in World War I was enacted and amended several times: *An Act to authorize the establishment of a Bureau of War Risk Insurance in the Treasury Department*, Public Law 63-193, *U. S. Statutes at Large* 38 (1914): 711. *An Act to Amend an Act entitled "An Act to authorize the establishment of a Bureau of War Risk Insurance in the Treasury Department" approved September second nineteen hundred fourteen and for other purposes*. Public Law 65-66, *U. S. Statutes at Large* 40 (1917): 102, and the identically titled further act, Public Law 65-90, *U.S. Statutes at Large* 40 (1917): 398.

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<sup>123</sup> *Army Bill of 1917*, § 12: 82-83. U.S. Constitution, amend. 18. *Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States*, S. J. Res. 17, 66<sup>th</sup> Cong. *U. S. Statutes at Large* 41 (1917): 1050.

<sup>124</sup> *Army Bill of 1917*, § 13: 83.

<sup>125</sup> *Army Bill of 1917*, § 14: 83. U.S. Constitution, art. 5, sec. 2.

<sup>126</sup> *An Act To regulate immigration of aliens to, and the residence of aliens in, the United States*, Public Law 64-301, *U. S. Statutes at Large* 39 (1917): 874.

<sup>129</sup> Among a myriad of cases see *Mayor of Philadelphia v. Education Equality League*, 415 U. S. 605 (1974), 620 and *International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States*, 431 U. S. 324 (1977), 339.

<sup>130</sup> PMG, *First Report*, Appendix Table 45, 115-116.

<sup>131</sup> PMG, *First Report*, 24, 115-116. "New Army Recruiting Record," *NYT*, May 2, 1917.

<sup>132</sup> National Archives and Records Administration, *Records of the Selective Service System (World War I)*, <http://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/163.html#163.1>. Web version based on Robert B. Matchette et al, comp. *Guide to Federal Records in the National Archives of the United States* (Washington, DC: National Archives and Records Administration, 1995). Walter V. Hickey, NARA Archives Specialist, e-mail to author, September 20, 2012.

<sup>133</sup> Chambers, *To Raise an Army*, 184.

<sup>134</sup> Both the Registration Cards and the Census enumerator forms were accessed at [www.Ancestry.com](http://www.Ancestry.com), a proprietary subscription service, focusing on genealogical research. Indices based on optical character recognition provide robust search capabilities.

<sup>135</sup> U. S. Bureau of the Census, *1910 Census, I*. U. S. Bureau of the Census, *1920 Census*. U. S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1916* (Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1917), 109-110. U. S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1917* (Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1918). U. S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1920* (Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1921), 48, 93.

<sup>136</sup> Higham, *Strangers in the Land*, 271.

<sup>137</sup> U. S. Bureau of the Census, *1910 Census: I*, 884. Cummings Properties, Cummings Center website, <http://www.cummings.com/history.html>, accessed March 2, 2013. Joseph E. Garland, *Boston's Gold Coast: The North Shore 1890-1929* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1981).

<sup>140</sup> U. S. Bureau of the Census, *1910 Census: I*, 893.

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<sup>141</sup> Bruce Watson, *Bread and Roses: Mills, Migrants, and the Struggle for the American Dream* (New York: Penguin Group, 2005), Kindle Edition, locations 650, 2858.

<sup>142</sup> *1921 Immigration Act: 5. 1924 Immigration Act: 153. Kennedy, Over Here, 162. Keene, Doughboys, 9. Keith, Rich Man's War, Poor Man's Fight, 198.*

<sup>143</sup> U. S. Bureau of the Census, *1920 Census: II*, 434.